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Decision-making is a complex process in which our brain has to combine different sources of information,
such as noisy sensory evidence and expected reward, in appropriate ways to obtain the outcome that
satisfies the decision-maker. Despite various studies on perceptual decision-making and value-based
decision making, it is still unclear how the brain combines sensory and reward information to make a
complex decision. A prime candidate for mediating this process is the basal ganglia pathway. This
pathway is known to make separate contributions to perceptual decisions based on the interpretation of
uncertain sensory evidence and value-based decisions that select among outcome options. To begin to
investigate what computations are performed by the brain, particularly in the basal ganglia, we trained
monkeys to perform a reward-biased visual motion direction discrimination task and performed singleunit extracellular recordings in the caudate nucleus, the input station in the basal ganglia. Fitting the
monkeys’ behaviors to a drift-diffusion model, we found that the monkeys used a rational heuristic to
combine sensory and reward information. This heuristic is suboptimal but leads to good-enough
outcomes. We also found that the monkeys’ reward biases were sensitive to the changes in the reward
functions from session to session. This adaptive adjustment could be a possible reason underlying the
individual variability in their decision strategies. By recording in the caudate nucleus, we found that it is
involved in both the decision-formation and evaluation: before the monkey started accumulating sensory
evidence, the caudate neurons represented the reward context that could be used to form a reward bias;
during decision-formation, some caudate neurons jointly represented sensory evidence and reward
information, which could facilitate the combining of sensory and reward information appropriately. After a
decision is made, caudate nucleus represented both decision confidence and reward expectation, two
evaluation-related quantities that influence the monkeys’ subsequent decision behaviors.
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ABSTRACT
THE NEURAL COMPUTATIONS IN THE CAUDATE NUCLEUS FOR REWARDBIASED PERCEPTUAL DECISION-MAKING
Yunshu Fan
Long Ding and Joshua I. Gold
Decision-making is a complex process in which our brain has to combine
different sources of information, such as noisy sensory evidence and expected reward,
in appropriate ways to obtain the outcome that satisfies the decision-maker. Despite
various studies on perceptual decision-making and value-based decision making, it is
still unclear how the brain combines sensory and reward information to make a complex
decision. A prime candidate for mediating this process is the basal ganglia pathway. This
pathway is known to make separate contributions to perceptual decisions based on the
interpretation of uncertain sensory evidence and value-based decisions that select
among outcome options. To begin to investigate what computations are performed by
the brain, particularly in the basal ganglia, we trained monkeys to perform a rewardbiased visual motion direction discrimination task and performed single-unit extracellular
recordings in the caudate nucleus, the input station in the basal ganglia. Fitting the
monkeys’ behaviors to a drift-diffusion model, we found that the monkeys used a rational
heuristic to combine sensory and reward information. This heuristic is suboptimal but
leads to good-enough outcomes. We also found that the monkeys’ reward biases were
sensitive to the changes in the reward functions from session to session. This adaptive
adjustment could be a possible reason underlying the individual variability in their
decision strategies. By recording in the caudate nucleus, we found that it is involved in
vii

both the decision-formation and evaluation: before the monkey started accumulating
sensory evidence, the caudate neurons represented the reward context that could be
used to form a reward bias; during decision-formation, some caudate neurons jointly
represented sensory evidence and reward information, which could facilitate the
combining of sensory and reward information appropriately. After a decision is made,
caudate nucleus represented both decision confidence and reward expectation, two
evaluation-related quantities that influence the monkeys’ subsequent decision behaviors.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Yunshu Fan, Joshua I Gold, Long Ding
Decision-making often requires combining evidence for and against different
options and their expected outcomes. For example, when we decide “should I eat more
chocolate”, and encounter a claim that “chocolate is healthy”, the decision could be
influenced by whether the claim is from a peer-reviewed research article or tabloid, and
by the desired outcome: “I hope it is true because I love chocolate!” Similarly, when we
decide whether to keep staying in academia, and encountered advice that “a faculty
position is harder to get nowadays”, the decision could be influenced by whether the
advice is written based on nation-wide statistical studies of faculty applicants or on
anecdotes from postdocs who failed to get faculty positions several times in a row, and
by an internal preference: “I really like doing research.” The ability of our brain to perform
computations that collect and interpret evidence with various levels of reliability and
combine that with our internal preference for specific outcomes gives us the capacity to
make complex decisions.
In this introduction, I will begin by reviewing computational frameworks used for
studying decision-making driven by sensory evidence (perceptual decision-making) and
decision-making driven by outcomes (value-based decision-making) and how the two
could be combined. I will then turn to the caudate nucleus in the basal ganglia, a brain
region that may play a key role in combining sensory evidence and reward outcomes in
decision-making, with a focus on the anatomical and neurophysiological findings that
support this role.
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Computational framework for perceptual decision-making
A perceptual decision is a categorical judgment about the state of the
environment based on the noisy data provided by the sensory system. We usually make
such decisions without even realizing it. For example, before crossing a road, we judge
whether a car is approaching us; on a trail, we might judge the wind direction based on
the fluttering leafs on a tree; an experienced cook might decide whether a steak is
cooked based on the sizzling sound; when tuning a guitar, we decide whether the pitch
is higher or lower than the standard; a hungry kid might know whether dinner is ready by
sniffing the air. In each case, the sensory inputs, like motion, pitch, odor, etc. that are
usually noisy. Therefore, the decision is not a simple reflex, but the result of a
deliberative process.
According to the signal detection theory (SDT, Green and Swets, 1966), the
perceptual decision-making process could be formalized as a form of statistical
inference. The possible alternatives corresponding to the different states of the world
could be thought of as hypotheses (H), and the sensory input as evidence (e). A
decision is made by selecting the most probable hypothesis supported by the evidence;
i.e., the posterior probability given the sensory input (

). When there are two

alternatives, H1 and H2, the selection process is equivalent to comparing the ratio of the
posteriors. When

, it suggests that H1 is more accurate than H2, thus H1

should be chosen; conversely, when

, H2 is more likely to be true, therefore

should be chosen. We can define a decision variable (DV) as follows:
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According to Bayes Rule,

, where

is the likelihood of

observing the specific evidence if that hypothesis is true. If the evidence supports one
alternative, say H1, more than the other, its likelihood under H1 should be much larger
than its likelihood under H2.

is the preconceived probability of Hi being true, and

is the probability of observing the evidence regardless of any particular hypothesis
being true. These quantities are also referred to as Priors. The prior over the evidence
is canceled out when computing the DV as in Eq. 1:

Consequently, in perceptual decision-making, a decision is influenced by the
likelihood ratio (

and the prior ratio (

).

Eq.2 assumes that there is only one piece of evidence for making the decision. If
the decision is based on multiple pieces of evidence, and if we assume that each piece
of evidence is independent from another, then the likelihood of observing all the
evidence would be the same as the product of the likelihood of observing each piece of
evidence. Therefore, the likelihood ratio in Eq. 2 can be expanded in the following way:
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We can take the log on both sides, such that Eq.2 becomes:

We can now redefine the decision variable as the log of the posterior ratio:

,
and compare the new DV with 0 when making a decision
Thus, under the assumption of independence of evidence, Eq. 4 suggests that
when there are multiple pieces of evidence, a decision maker can simply add all the log
likelihood ratios together.
This formulation also gives us an easy way to deal with each new piece of
evidence. If we think of each piece of evidence as the sensory input at a given time (t),
accumulating additional piece of evidence at time t+1 is equivalent to update the DV by
adding the log likelihood ratio of the new evidence and comparing the updated DV with
0.
This framework is the basic form of the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT,
Barnard, 1946; Wald, 1947).
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If the decision maker only cares about which hypothesis is more probable than
the other so as to select one option, then the magnitude of DV does not matter.
However, the magnitude of DV influences accuracy. For example, even though DV = 0.1 and DV = -1 both support choosing H2, the first suggests a lower certainty (a.k.a.,
accuracy) in the choice than the second.
If the sensory evidence indeed supports one choice, i.e., there is signal in the
sensory input (not pure noise), then adding additional evidence can, in theory, increase
the magnitude of DV, therefore making the decision more accurate. In other words,
accumulating noisy evidence can strengthen the signal by averaging out sensory noise.
Therefore, if the decision makers can determine how long to accumulate
evidence before committing to a decision, they can control the overall accuracy of the
decision by setting the bounds for DV to reach before committing to one decision or
another. They can aim for more accuracy by accumulating more evidence, which takes
longer time, or he/she can aim for less accurate but faster decision by accumulate less
evidence. This balance is known as the “speed-accuracy trade-off” (Palmer et al., 2005;
Forstmann et al., 2010; Hanks et al., 2011).
To summarize, the decision-making process can be described as follows: update
the DV by accumulating evidence, and compare the DV with the bounds. If the DV
reaches a bound, stop accumulating and commit to the decision represented by that
bound; if not, accumulate more evidence.
When we treat time as a continuous term instead of discrete, this process is
formulated as the drift-diffusion model (DDM), the model that I will use in the following
chapters. The DDM was first applied to psychology/neuroscience study to explain the
memory retrieval process (Ratcliff, 1978). Since then, it has been used to explain the
5

behaviors in a variety of decision-making tasks (ref). Its quantitative framework has
facilitated the discovery of neural correlates of behavior in many brain areas (ref).
In the DDM, momentary evidence is modeled as a Gaussian distribution, i.e.,
assuming noise in the sensory input is independent from time to time. The mean of the
momentary evidence is a monotonic function of the signal strength of the sensory input.
For example, in a motion discrimination task, momentary evidence is typically modeled
as the coherence of the moving dots multiplied by a scaling factor (Palmer et al., 2005).
This way of modeling the momentary evidence is supported by the finding that motion
sensitive neurons in visual cortex that are involved in motion discrimination scaled their
responses with coherence (Salzman et al., 1992; Britten et al., 1993).
The DV is the time integral of the momentary evidence and is constantly
compared with two bounds that represent the total amount of evidence needed to
commit to the two options, respectively. The DV will gradually drift to one bound or the
other over time due to the signal in the sensory input. When the sensory evidence is
strong, the DV will drift towards and reach a bound faster; when the sensory evidence is
weaker, the DV will drift towards and reach a bound slower.
Neural correlates of the momentary evidence should be sensitive to the stimulus
strength and not change with time. In contrast, neural correlates of the DV should reflect
both the stimulus strength and the evidence accumulation over time. Neural correlates of
momentary evidence are often found in sensory areas. For example, visual motion
evidence is conveyed by the motion sensitive neurons in extrastriate areas MT and MST
(Britten et al., 1992; Celebrini and Newsome, 1994; Britten et al., 1996). Evidence about
vibrotactile frequency was found in the primary somatosensory cortex (Mountcastle et
al., 1990; Salinas et al., 2000). Neurons in the middle-lateral and anterolateral belt
6

region of the auditory cortex encode sound frequency evidence in high/low pitch
discrimination(Tsunada et al., 2015). Neural correlates of DV have been found in
sensorimotor or motor-related areas, such as, the lateral intraparietal area (Roitman and
Shadlen, 2002), frontal eye field(Ding and Gold, 2012a), and the pre-motor
cortex(Suriya-Arunroj and Gail, 2019).
So far, I have described computational framework dealing with decision-making
based on sensory evidence. Next I am going to introduce the computational framework
dealing with decision-making based on outcomes from choices (value-based decisionmaking).
Computational framework for value-based decision-making
Value-based decision-making is a process that is primarily driven by different
outcomes. It is usually studied in tasks where the sensory input does not have ambiguity
and in the context of economic decisions. A decision is made by comparing the expected
utility (EU, a.k.a. value) of different outcomes. The expected utility of an option is
computed by multiplying the subjective estimate of the magnitude of the outcome
(usually in the form of reward (R)) with the probability of obtaining that outcome (usually
set ahead of time and therefore does not need computing):

For example, the probability of the rewards might be manipulated as follows: the subject
is presented with one option that is rewarded 70% of the time, and the other option 50%
of the time. The magnitude of the reward could also be manipulated so that one option
appears more favorable than the other. A search for brain regions with neural activity
that reflects reward magnitude, reward probability or EU, has demonstrated value
7

representation in many brain areas, such as the medial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal
cortex, lateral intraparietal area, caudate nucleus, putamen and ventral striatum
(Lauwereyns et al., 2002; Samejima et al., 2005; Ding and Hikosaka, 2006; Nakamura
and Hikosaka, 2006; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008; Tom et al., 2007; Lau
and Glimcher, 2008).
A possible computational framework that combines perceptual decision-making
and value-based decision making
Thus far, I have described computational frameworks for sensory-based and
value-based decision-making separately. However, as in the example I gave at the very
beginning, real-world choices usually involve combining sensory evidence with nonsensory factors, such as the preference driven by outcomes. One way to combine them
is incorporating the expected utility theory with the DDM.
If we assume that a decision is made by choosing the option with the larger EU,
we can still construct a DV that is the log ratio of the expected utilities of the two options
and compare it with 0. The expected utility of each option can be computed based on
Eq. 5. We can approximate the probability of obtaining the reward associated with an
option (

) with the posterior of the hypothesis of that option being true (

this way, the new DV becomes:

8

). In

Eq. 6 suggested that the decision-making process combining sensory and nonsensory factors could be regarded as a modified version of evidence accumulation. The
subjective difference between the two rewards (

of evidence accumulation. Meanwhile,

) could change the DV independent

could be parsed into individual evidence:

Eq. 7 suggests that the difference in rewards could also lead to misinterpretation
of the evidence so they all seem to support one of the options more than under neutral
condition, therefore changing the momentary evidence.
In the DDM framework, these two changes could be implemented as changes in
the starting value of the DV and in the momentary evidence.
When the signal strength in the noisy sensory input is constant, the optimal
strategy is to adjust only the starting value of the DV; when the signal strength can be
variable, the optimal strategy is to adjust both the starting value and the momentary
evidence (Bogacz et al., 2006). When making perceptual decisions that are biased
towards the percept associated with the larger payoff, human and animal subjects
showed high individual variations in whether they adjusted the starting value, the
momentary evidence or both (Voss et al., 2004; Simen et al., 2009; Summerfield and
9

Koechlin, 2010; Leite and Ratcliff, 2011; Mulder et al., 2012; Goldfarb et al., 2014; Cicmil
et al., 2015). It is unknown what drives a subject’s particular strategy.
Caudate nucleus and decision-making
The caudate nucleus is one of the input stations of the basal ganglia, a network
of interconnected subcortical nuclei. Its anatomical connection and physiological
properties suggest that it might be involved in combining sensory evidence and reward
information in decision-making.
Anatomically, it receives inputs from brain regions that process sensory
information, as well as regions that carry reward-related information. For example, the
caudate nucleus receives projections from areas such as the MT, MST, LIP and FEF,
which have been shown to be involved in an oculomotor decision task by processing the
visual motion information (Maunsell and Van Essen, 1983; Selemon and GoldmanRakic, 1985, 1988; Newsome et al., 1989; Saint‐ Cyr et al., 1990; Britten et al., 1992,
1996; Salzman et al., 1992; Yeterian and Pandya, 1995; Shadlen and Newsome, 1996;
Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Ditterich et al., 2003; Hanks et al.,
2006; Ding and Gold, 2012b). It also receives inputs from brain areas carrying reward- or
value-related signals, such as the medial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex (Haber et
al., 1995; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007). In addition, the
dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) and the ventral
tegmental area (VTA) project densely to the caudate nucleus. These dopaminergic
neurons encode reward-prediction error signals, which could further modulate how
sensory and reward information are combined, especially during learning (Lak et al.,
2019).
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Neurophysiological evidence also supports the caudate nucleus’s roles in
sensory and reward processing. For sensory processing, during a visual decision task
and an auditory decision task, neural activity in the striatum was found to correlate with
the strength of the sensory evidence (Ding and Gold, 2010; Seo et al., 2012; Wang et
al., 2018; Yartsev et al., 2018). Manipulating caudate activity during decision-making in
both tasks biased the animals’ decisions, suggesting a causal role of the caudate
nucleus in interpreting sensory information. In the post-decision period, caudate neural
activity was found to correlate with some aspects of the sensory information in task,
which could be used as decision monitoring and evaluation (Ding and Gold, 2010;
Yanike and Ferrera, 2014). It is worth noting that, in these studies, the reward was
identical for both choices. Therefore, their results cannot inform us how reward
information and sensory information are combined.
For reward processing, when monkeys were asked to choose from two options
with different magnitudes of reward, caudate neurons were found to encode the values
of the options during decision and the value of the option chosen after decision(Lau and
Glimcher, 2008). In another experimental paradigm, monkeys were trained to make a
saccadic eye movement to a target flashed at one of two possible locations, with one
location associated with large reward, the other small (or one with reward, the other
without) (Kawagoe et al., 1998; Lauwereyns et al., 2002; Ding and Hikosaka, 2006). The
monkeys’ reaction time was found to be faster towards the large reward target. Neural
activity in the caudate nucleus was found to represent the reward-location association.
Manipulating the neural activity via dopamine antagonists influences the rewarddependent reaction time(Nakamura and Hikosaka, 2006). In human fMRI studies,
caudate BOLD signal was found to represent a bias toward the option with higher reward
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probability (Forstmann et al., 2010; Mulder et al., 2012). However, in those studies with
reward manipulation, the sensory information was either with 100% certainty (visually
instructed) or with a constant level of ambiguity, so their findings also cannot address
how sensory and reward information are combined in the caudate nucleus.
My thesis examines how the brain combines sensory and reward information
during decision-making and the computational roles of the caudate nucleus before,
during and after such decisions. To this aim, I trained monkeys to perform a rewardbiased perceptual decision-making task and recorded in their caudate nucleus while they
were performing the task. In the first chapter I will present my findings on the strategies
used by individual monkeys to combine sensory and reward information and the
common principles underlying their strategies; in the second chapter, I will describe the
neural representation of information in the caudate nucleus with a focus on how it
contributes to combining sensory and reward information before, during and after the
decision-making; in the third chapter, I will focus on the evaluative nature of the postdecision activity in the caudate nucleus.
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Introduction
Normative theory has played an important role in our understanding of how the
brain forms decisions. For example, many perceptual, memory, and reward-based
decisions show inherent trade-offs between speed and accuracy. These trade-offs are
parsimoniously captured by a class of sequential-sampling models, such as the driftdiffusion model (DDM), that are based on the accumulation of noisy evidence over time
to a pre-defined threshold value, or bound (Ratcliff, 1978; Gold and Shadlen, 2002;
Bogacz et al., 2006; Krajbich et al., 2010). These models have close ties to statistical
decision theory, particularly the sequential probability ratio test that can, under certain
assumptions, maximize expected accuracy for a given number of samples or minimize
the number of samples needed for a given level of accuracy (Barnard, 1946; Wald,
1947; Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948). However, even when these models provide good
descriptions of the average behavior of groups of subjects, they may not capture the
substantial variability under different conditions and/or across individual subjects. The
goal of this study was to better understand the principles that govern this variability, in
particular how these principles relate to normative theory.
We focused on a perceptual decision-making task with asymmetric rewards. For
this task, both human and animal subjects tend to make decisions that are biased
towards the percept associated with the larger payoff (e.g. Maddox and Bohil, 1998;
Voss et al., 2004; Diederich and Busemeyer, 2006; Liston and Stone, 2008; Serences,
2008; Feng et al., 2009; Simen et al., 2009; Nomoto et al., 2010; Summerfield and
Koechlin, 2010; Teichert and Ferrera, 2010; Gao et al., 2011; Leite and Ratcliff, 2011;
Mulder et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013; White and Poldrack, 2014). These biases are
roughly consistent with a rational strategy to maximize a particular reward function that
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depends on both the speed and accuracy of the decision process, such as the reward
rate per trial or per unit time (Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Bogacz et al, 2006). This strategy
can be accomplished via context-dependent adjustments in a DDM-like decision process
along two primary dimensions (Figure 2.1A): 1) the momentary sensory evidence, via
the drift rate; and 2) the decision rule, via the relative bound heights that govern how
much evidence is needed for each alternative (Ratcliff, 1985). Subjects tend to make
adjustments along one or both of these dimensions to produce overall biases that are
consistent with normative theory, but with substantial individual variability (Voss et al.,
2004; Cicmil et al., 2015; Bogacz et al., 2006; Simen et al., 2009; Summerfield and
Koechlin, 2010; Leite and Ratcliff, 2011; Mulder et al., 2012; Goldfarb et al., 2014).
To better understand the principles that govern these kinds of idiosyncratic
behavioral patterns, we trained three monkeys to perform a response-time (RT),
asymmetric-reward decision task with mixed perceptual uncertainty (Figure 2.1B). Like
human subjects, the monkeys showed robust decision biases toward the large-reward
option. These biases were sensitive to not just the reward asymmetry, as has been
shown previously, but also to experience-dependent changes in perceptual sensitivity.
These biases were consistent with adjustments to both the momentary evidence and
decision rule in the DDM. However, these two adjustments favored the large- and smallreward choice, respectively, leading to nearly, but not exactly, maximal reward rates. We
accounted for these adjustments in terms of a satisficing, gradient-based learning model
that calibrated biases to balance the relative influence of perceptual and reward-based
information on the decision process. Together, the results imply complementary roles of
normative and heuristic principles to understand how the brain combines uncertain
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sensory input and internal preferences to form decisions that can vary considerably
across individuals and task conditions.

Figure 2.1. Theoretical framework and task design.
(A) Schematics of the drift-diffusion model (DDM). Motion evidence is modeled as samples from a unitvariance Gaussian distribution (mean: signed coherence, Coh). Effective evidence is modeled as the
sum of motion evidence and an internal momentary-evidence bias (me). The decision variable starts at
value az, where z governs decision-rule bias, and accumulates effective evidence over time with a
proportional scaling factor (k). A decision is made when the decision variable reaches either bound.
Reaction time (RT) is assumed to be the sum of the decision time and a saccade-specific non-decision
time.
(B) Reaction-time (RT) random-dot visual motion direction discrimination task with asymmetric rewards.
A monkey makes a saccade decision based on the perceived global motion of a random-dot
kinematogram. Reward is delivered on correct trials and with a magnitude that depends on reward
context. Two reward contexts (LR-Left and LR-Right) were alternated in blocks of trials with signaled
block changes. Motion directions and strengths were randomly interleaved within blocks.
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Results
We trained three monkeys to perform the asymmetric-reward random-dot motion
discrimination (“dots”) task (Figure 2.2A). All three monkeys were initially trained on a
symmetric-reward version of the task for which they were required to make fast eye
movements (saccades) in the direction congruent with the global motion of a random-dot
kinematogram to receive juice reward. They then performed the asymmetric-reward
versions that were the focus of this study. Specifically, in blocks of 30–50 trials, we
alternated direction-reward associations between a “LR-Right” reward context (the large
reward was paired with a correct rightward saccade and the small reward was paired
with a correct leftward saccade) and the opposite “LR-Left” reward context. We also
varied the ratio of large versus small reward magnitudes (“reward ratio”) across sessions
for each monkey. Within a block, we randomly interleaved motion stimuli with different
directions and motion strengths (expressed as coherence, the fraction of dots moving in
the same direction). We monitored the monkey’s choice (which saccade to make) and
RT (when to make the saccade) on each trial.

The monkeys’ biases reflected changes in reward context and perceptual
sensitivity
For the asymmetric-reward task, all three monkeys tended to make more choices
towards the large-reward option, particularly when the sensory evidence was weak.
These choice biases corresponded to horizontal shifts in the psychometric function
describing the probability of making a rightward choice as a function of signed motion
coherence (negative for leftward motion, positive for rightward motion; Figure 2.2A, plus
example fits shown in Figure 2.2–figure supplement 1). These functions showed
22

somewhat similar patterns of behavior but some differences in detail for the three
monkeys. For example, each monkey showed steady increases in perceptual sensitivity
(steepness of the psychometric function), which initially dropped relative to values from
the symmetric-reward task then tended to increase with more experience with
asymmetric rewards (Figure 2.2B, top; H0: partial Spearman’s  of sensitivity versus
session index after accounting for session-specific reward ratios=0, p<0.01 in all cases,
except LR-Left for monkey C, for which 0.56). Moreover, lapse rates were near zero
across sessions (Figure 2.2B, bottom), implying that the monkeys knew how to perform
the task. However, the monkeys differed in terms of overall bias, which was the smallest
in monkey F. Nevertheless, for all three monkeys bias magnitude tended to decrease
over sessions, although this tendency was statistically significant only for monkey C after
accounting for co-variations with reward rate (Figure 2.2B, middle). There was often a
negative correlation between choice bias and sensitivity, consistent with a general
strategy of adjusting bias to obtain more reward (Figure 2.2C; Figure 2–figure
supplement 2C). Monkeys F and C used suboptimal biases that were larger than the
optimal values, whereas monkey A showed greater variations (Figure 2.2D). The
monkeys showed only negligible or inconsistent sequential choice biases (Figure 2.2–
figure supplement 1), and adding sequential terms did not substantially affect the bestfitting values of the non-sequential terms in the logistic regression (spearman’s ρ>0.8
comparing session-by-session best-fitting values of the terms in Eq. (1) with and without
additional sequential terms from Eq. (2)). Therefore, all subsequent analyses did not
include sequential choice effects.
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Figure 2.2. Relationships between sensitivity and bias from logistic fits to choice data.
(A) For each monkey, the probability of making a rightward choice is plotted as a function of signed
coherence (–/+ indicate left/right motion) from all sessions, separately for the two reward contexts, as
indicated. Lines are logistic fits.
(B) Top row: Motion sensitivity (steepness of the logistic function) in each context as a function of
session index (colors as in A). Solid lines indicate significant positive partial Spearman correlation after
accounting for changes in reward ratio across sessions (p<0.05). Black dashed lines indicate each
monkey’s motion sensitivity for the task with equal rewards before training on this asymmetric reward
task. Middle row: ΔBias (horizontal shift between the two psychometric functions for the two reward
contexts at chance level) as a function of session index. Solid line indicates significant negative partial
Spearman correlation after accounting for changes in reward ratio across sessions (p<0.05). Bottom
row: Lapse rate as a function of session index (median=0 for all three monkeys).
(C) ΔBias as a function of motion sensitivity for each reward context (colors as in A). Solid line indicates
a significant negative partial Spearman correlation after accounting for changes in reward ratio across
sessions (p<0.05).
(D) Optimal versus fitted Δbias. Optimal Δbias was computed as the difference in the horizontal shift in
the psychometric functions in each reward context that would have resulted in the maximum reward per
trial, given each monkey’s fitted motion sensitivity and experienced values of reward ratio and
coherences from each session (see Figure 2-figure supplement 2). Solid lines indicate significant
positive Spearman correlations (p<0.01). Partial Spearman correlation after accounting for changes in
reward ratio across sessions are also significant for moneys F and C (p<0.05).

Figure 2.2-figure supplement 1. Monkeys showed minimal sequential choice biases.
Histogram of the fraction of sessions with 0, 1 or 2 types of sequential choice biases. Colors indicate the
sequential bias types with respect to the previous reward (Large or Small) and outcome (Correct or
Error), as indicated. Significant sequential bias effects were identified by a likelihood-ratio test for H0: the
sequential term in the logistic regression=0, p<0.05.
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Figure 2.2-figure supplement 2. The optimal bias decreases with increasing sensitivity.
(A) Identification of the optimal Δbias for an example session using logistic fits. For each reward context
(blue for LR-Left and red for LR-Right), RTrial was computed as a function of bias values sampled
uniformly over a broad range, given the session-specific sensitivities, lapse rate, coherences and
large:small reward ratio. The optimal Δbias was defined as the difference between the bias values with
the maximal RTrial for the two reward contexts. The fitted Δbias was defined as the difference between
the fitted bias values for the two reward contexts.
(B) The optimal bias decreases with increasing sensitivity. The example heatmap shows normalized
RTrial as a function of sensitivity and bias values in the LR-Right blocks, assuming the same coherence
levels as used for the monkeys and a large:small reward ratio of 2.3. The black curve indicates the
optimal bias values for a given sensitivity value.
(C) Scatterplots of optimal Δbiases obtained via the procedure described above as a function of
sensitivity for each of the two reward contexts. Same format as Figure 3B. Solid lines indicate significant
partial Spearman correlation after accounting for changes in reward ratio across sessions (p<0.05). Note
that the scatterplots of the monkeys’ Δbiases and sensitivities in Figure 2C also show negative
correlations, similar to this pattern.

To better understand the computational principles that governed these
idiosyncratic biases, while also taking into account systematic relationships between the
choice and RT data, we fit single-trial RT data (i.e., we modeled full RT distributions, not
just mean RTs) from individual sessions to a DDM. We used a hierarchical-DDM
(HDDM) method that assumes that parameters from individual sessions of the same
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monkey are samples from a group distribution (Wiecki et al., 2013). The HDDM was fit to
data from each monkey separately. The HDDM had six parameters for each reward
context. Four were from a basic DDM (Figure 2.1A): a, the total bound height,
representing the distance between the two choice bounds; k, a scaling factor that
converts sensory evidence (motion strength and direction) to the drift rate; and t0 and t1,
non-decision times for leftward and rightward choices, respectively. The additional two
parameters provided biases that differed in terms of their effects on the full RT
distributions (Figure 2.3–figure supplement 1): me, which is additional momentary
evidence that is added to the motion evidence at each accumulating step and has
asymmetric effects on the two choices and on correct versus error trials (positive values
favor the rightward choice); and z, which determines the decision rules for the two
choices and tends to have asymmetric effects on the two choices but not on correct
versus error trials (values >0.5 favor the rightward choice). The HDDM fitting results are
shown in Figure 2.3, and summaries of best-fitting parameters and goodness-of-fit
metrics are provided in Table 1. A DDM variant with collapsing bounds provided
qualitatively similar results as the HDDM (Figure 2.3–figure supplement 2). Thus,
subsequent analyses use the model with fixed bounds, unless otherwise noted.
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Figure 2.3–figure supplement 1. Qualitative comparison between the monkeys’ RT distribution
and DDM predictions.
(A) RT distributions as predicted by a DDM with no bias in decision rule (z) or momentary evidence (me;
left), with me>0 (middle), and with z>0.5 (right). RT distributions are shown separately for correct (red)
and error (black) trials and using values corresponding to 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles. Note
that the predictions assumed zero non-decision time to demonstrate effects on RT by only me or z
biases. Positive/negative coh values indicate rightward/leftward saccades. The values of me and z were
chosen to induce similar choice biases (~0.075 in coherence units). Note that the me bias induces large
asymmetries in RT both between the two choices and between correct and error trials, whereas the z
bias induces a large asymmetry in RT for the two choices, but with little asymmetry between correct and
error trials.
(B) The monkeys’ mean RTs for four quantiles for the LR-Right (top) and LR-Left (bottom) reward
contexts, respectively (same convention as in A). Note the presence of substantial asymmetries between
correct and error trials for all three monkeys.
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Figure 2.3. Comparison of choice and RT data to HDDM fits with both momentary-evidence (me)
and decision-rule (z) biases.
(A) Psychometric data (points as in Figure 2A) shown with predictions based on HDDM fits to both
choice and RT data.
(B) RT data (circles) and HDDM-predicted RT distributions (lines). Both sets of RT data were plotted as
th

th

th

th

the session-averaged values corresponding to the 20 , 40 , 60 , and 80 percentiles of the full
distribution for the five most frequently used coherence levels (we only show data when >40% of the
total sessions contain >4 trials for that combination of motion direction, coherence and reward context).
Top row: Trials in which monkey chose the left target. Bottom row: Trials in which monkeys chose the
right target. Columns correspond to each monkey (as in A), divided into choices in the large- (left
column) or small- (right column) reward direction (correct/error choices are as indicated in the left-most
columns; note that no reward was given on error trials). The HDDM-predicted RT distributions were
generated with 50 runs of simulations, each run using the number of trials per condition (motion direction
 coherence  reward context  session) matched to experimental data and using the best-fitting HDDM
parameters for that monkey
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Figure 2.3–figure supplement 2. Fits to a DDM with collapsing bounds.
(A, B) A DDM with collapsing bounds and both momentary evidence (me) and decision rule (z) biases fit
to each monkey’s RT data. Same format as Figure 3.
(C) The model that included both me and z adjustments (“full”) had smaller Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) values than reduced models (“me” or “z” only) across sessions. Note also the different ranges of
ΔAIC for the full–me and full–z comparisons. The mean ΔAIC (full-me) and ΔAIC (full-z) values are
significantly different from zero (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.0007 for Monkey F’s full–me comparison
and p<0.0001 for all others).
(D) RT distributions as predicted by the DDM with collapsing bounds, using no bias in z or me (left),
me>0 (middle), or z>0.5 (right). Same format as Figure 3–figure supplement 1A.

Table 2.1 Best fitting DDM parameters.

a
k

Monkey F (26079 trials)
Monkey C (37161 trials)
Monkey F (21089 trials)
LR-Left
LR-Right
LR-Left
LR-Right
LR-Left
LR-Right
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean
Std
Mean Std
1.67 0.16 1.43 0.12 1.77 0.09 1.53 0.13 1.33
0.13
1.36 0.09
10.22 1.87 9.91 2.11 6.58 0.51 5.08 0.92 4.04
0.33
3.45 0.46

t1

0.31

0.03

0.29

0.03

0.35

0.04

0.33

0.05

0.29

0.04

0.27

0.04

t0
z
me

0.28

0.04

0.31

0.05

0.33

0.04

0.31

0.03

0.21

0.08

0.26

0.04

0.60
-0.06

0.03
0.04

0.57
0.08

0.04
0.05

0.62
-0.14

0.03
0.04

0.40
0.21

0.04
0.06

0.57
-0.22

0.06
0.05

0.39
0.27

0.04
0.09

The DDM fits provided a parsimonious account of both the choice and RT data.
Consistent with the results from the logistic analyses, the HDDM analyses showed that
the monkeys made systematic improvements in psychometric sensitivity (H0: partial
Spearman’s  of sensitivity versus session index after accounting for session-specific
reward ratios=0, p<0.01 in all cases except p=0.06 for LR-Left for monkey A). Moreover,
there was a negative correlation between psychometric sensitivity and choice bias (H0:
partial Spearman’s  of sensitivity versus total bias after accounting for session-specific
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reward ratios=0, p<0.001 in all cases). These fits ascribed the choice biases to changes
in both the momentary evidence (me) and the decision rule (z) of the decision process,
as opposed to either parameter alone (Table 2). These fits also indicated contextdependent differences in non-decision times, which were smaller for all large-reward
choices for all three monkeys except in the LR-Right context for monkeys C and A (ttest, p<0.05). However, the differences in non-decision times were relatively small
across reward contexts, suggesting that the observed reward biases were driven
primarily by effects on decision-related processes.

Table 2.2 Model comparisons.
The difference in deviance information criterion (DIC) between the full model (i.e., the model that includes
both me and z) and either reduced model (me-only or z-only), for experimental data and data simulated
using each reduced model. Negative/positive values favor the full/reduced model. Note that the DIC values
for the experimental data were all strongly negative, favoring the full model. In contrast, the DIC values for
the simulated data were all positive, implying that this procedure did not simply prefer the more complex
model.

Monkey F
Monkey C
Monkey A

Experimental Data
∆DIC: full me
∆DIC: full z
Mean
Std
Mean Std
-124.6
2.3 -2560.4 5.2
-1700.4
2.1 -6937.9 1.3
-793.6
3.4 -2225.7 4.0

Simu: me model Simu: z model
∆DIC: full me
∆DIC: full z
Mean
Std Mean
Std
3.1
9.8
0.2
11.8
17.5
11.3
1.8
1.3
25.4
9.0
1.2
3.4

The monkeys’ bias adjustments were adaptive with respect to optimal reward-rate
functions
To try to identify common principles that governed these monkey- and contextdependent decision biases, we analyzed behavior with respect to optimal benchmarks
based on certain reward-rate functions. We focused on reward per unit time (RR) and
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per trial (RTrial), which for this task are optimized in a DDM framework by adjusting
momentary-evidence (me) and decision-rule (z) biases, such that both favor the largereward choice. However, the magnitudes of these optimal adjustments depend on other
task parameters (a, k, t0, and t1, non-bias parameters from the DDM, plus the ratio of the
two reward sizes and inter-trial intervals) that can vary from session to session. Thus, to
determine the optimal adjustments, we performed DDM simulations with the fitted HDDM
parameters from each session, using different combinations of me and z values (Figure
2.4A). As reported previously (Bogacz et al., 2006; Simen et al., 2009), when the large
reward was paired with the leftward choice, the optimal strategy used z<0.5 and me<0
(Figure 2.4B, top panels, purple and orange circles for RR and RTrial, respectively).
Conversely, when the larger reward was paired with the rightward choice, the optimal
strategy used z>0.5 and me>0 (Figure 2.4B, bottom panels).
The monkeys’ adjustments of momentary-evidence (me) and decision-rule (z)
biases showed both differences and similarities with respect to these optimal predictions
(Figure 2.4B, black circles; similar results were obtained using fits from a model with
collapsing bounds, Figure 2.4–figure supplement 1). In the next section, we consider the
differences, in particular the apparent use of shifts in me in the adaptive direction (i.e.,
favoring the large-reward choice) but of a magnitude that was larger than predicted,
along with shifts in z that tended to be in the non-adaptive direction (i.e., favoring the
small-reward choice). Here we focus on the similarities and show that the monkeys’
decision biases were adaptive with respect to the reward-rate function in four ways
(RTrial provided slightly better predictions of the data and thus are presented in the main
figures; results based on RR are presented in the Supplementary Figures).
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Figure 2.4. Actual versus optimal adjustments of momentary-evidence (me) and decision-rule (z)
biases.
(A) Schematic of the comparison procedure. Choice and RT data from the two reward contexts in a
given session were fitted separately using the HDDM. These context- and session-specific best-fitting
me and z values are plotted as the monkey’s data (black circles in B and C). Optimal values were
determined by fixing parameters a, k, and non-decision times at best-fitted values from the HDDM and
searching in the me/z grid space for combinations of me and z that produced maximal reward function
values. For each me and z combination, the predicted probability of left/right choice and RTs were used
with actual task information (inter-trial interval, error timeout and reward sizes) to calculate the expected
reward rate (RR) and average reward per trial (RTrial). Optimal me/z adjustments were then identified to
maximize RR (purple) or RTrial (orange).
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(B) Scatterplots of the monkeys’ me/z adjustments (black), predicted optimal adjustments for maximal
RR (purple), and predicted optimal adjustments for maximal Rtrial (orange), for the two reward contexts
in all sessions (each data point was from a single session). Values of me>0 or z>0.5 produce biases
favoring rightward choices.
(C) Scatterplots of the differences in me (abscissa) and z (ordinate) between the two reward contexts for
monkeys (black), for maximizing RR (purple), and for maximizing RTrial (orange). Positive Δme and Δz
values produce biases favoring large-reward choices.

Figure 2.4–figure supplement 1. Estimates
of momentary-evidence (me) and decisionrule (z) biases using the collapsing-bound
DDM fits.
Same format as Figure 4B and C, except here
only showing fits to the monkeys’ data. As
with the model without collapsing bounds, the
adjustments in me tended to favor the large
reward but the adjustments in z tended to
favor the small reward.

First, the best-fitting me and z values from each monkey corresponded to nearmaximal reward rates (Figure 2.5A). We compared the optimal values of reward per trial
(RTrialmax) to the values predicted from the monkeys’ best-fitting me and z adjustments
(RTrialpredict). Both RTrialpredict and RTrialmax depended on the same non-bias parameters
in the HDDM fits that were determined per session (a, k, t0, and t1) and thus are directly
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comparable. Their ratios tended to be nearly, but slightly less than, one (mean ratio:
0.977, 0.984, and 0.983 for monkeys F, C, and A, respectively) and remained relatively
constant across sessions (H0: slopes of linear regressions of these ratios versus session
number=0, p>0.05 for all three monkeys). Similar results were also obtained using the
monkeys’ realized rewards, which closely matched RTrialpredict (mean ratio: 0.963, 0.980
and 0.974; across-session Spearman’s ρ=0.976, 0.995, and 0.961, for monkeys F, C,
and A, respectively, p<0.0001 in all three cases). These results reflected the shallow
plateau in the RTrial function near its peak (Figure 2.5B), such that the monkeys’ actual
adjustments of me and z were within the contours for 97% RTrialmax in most sessions
(Figure 2.5C; see Figure 2.5–figure supplement 1 for results using RR). Thus, the
monkeys’ overall choice biases were consistent with strategies that lead to nearly
optimal reward outcomes.
Second, the across-session variability of each monkey’s decision biases was
predicted by idiosyncratic features of the reward functions. The reward functions were,
on average, different for the two reward contexts and each of the three monkeys (Figure
6A). These differences included the size of the near-maximal plateau (red patch), which
determined the level of tolerance in RTrial for deviations from optimal adjustments in me
and z. This tolerance corresponded to the session-by-session variability in each
monkey’s me and z adjustments (Figure 2.6B). In general, monkey F had the smallest
plateaus and tended to use the narrowest range of me and z adjustments across
sessions. In contrast, monkey A had the largest plateaus and tended to use the widest
range of me and z adjustments (Pearson’s  between the size of the 97% RTrial
contour, in pixels, and the sum of the across-session variances in each monkeys’ me
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and z adjustments=0.83, p=0.041). Analyses using the RR function produced
qualitatively similar results (Figure 2.6–figure supplement 1).

Figure 2.5. Predicted versus optimal
reward per trial (RTrial).
(A) Scatterplots of RTrialpredict:RTrialmax ratio
as a function of session index. Each session
was represented by two ratios, one for each
reward context. Mean ratio across contexts
and sessions: 0.977 for monkey F, 0.984 for
monkey C, and 0.983 for monkey A.
(B) 97% RTrialmax contours for all sessions,
computed using the best-fitting HDDM
parameters and experienced coherences
and reward ratios from each session. Light
grey: LR-Left blocks; Dark grey: LR-Right
blocks.
(C) The monkeys’ adjustments (blue in LRLeft blocks, red in LR-Right blocks) were
largely within the 97% RTrialmax contours for
all sessions and tended to cluster in the me
over-biased, z under-biased quadrants
(except Monkey F in the LR-Right blocks).
The contours and monkeys’ adjustments are
centered at the optimal adjustments for each
session.
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Figure 2.5–figure supplement 1.
Predicted versus optimal reward
rate (RR). Same format as Figure 5.
Mean RRpredict:RRmax ratio across
sessions=0.971 for monkey F, 0.980
for monkey C, and 0.980 for monkey
A.
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Figure 2.6. Relationships between adjustments of momentary-evidence (me) and decision-rule (z)
biases and RTrial function properties.
(A) Mean RTrial as a function of me and z adjustments for the LR-Left (top) and LR-Right (bottom)
blocks. Hotter colors represent larger RTrial values (see legend to the right). RTrial was normalized to
RTrialmax for each session and then averaged across sessions.
(B) Scatterplot of the total variance in me and z adjustments across sessions (ordinate) and the area of
>97% max of the average RTrial patch (abscissa). Variance and patch areas were measured separately
for the two reward blocks (circles for LR-Left blocks, squares for LR-Right blocks).
(C, D) The monkeys’ session- and context-specific values of me (C) and z (D) co-varied with the
orientation of the >97% heatmap patch (same as the contours in Figure 5B). Orientation is measured as
the angle of the tilt from vertical. Circles: data from LR-Left block; squares: data from LR-Right block;
lines: significant correlation between me (or z) and patch orientations across monkeys (p<0.05). Colors
indicate different monkeys (see legend in B).
(E) Scatterplots of conditionally optimal versus fitted me (top row) and z (bottom row). For each
reward context, the conditionally optimal me (z) value was identified given the monkey’s best-fitting z
(me) values. The conditionally optimal me (z) was the difference between the two conditional optimal
me (z) values for the two reward contexts. Grey lines indicate the range of conditional me (z) values
corresponding to the 97% maximal RTrial given the monkeys’ fitted z (me) values.
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Figure 2.6–figure supplement 1. The monkeys’ momentary-evidence (me) and decision-rule (z)
adjustments reflected RR function properties. Same format as Figure 6, but using RR instead of
RTrial.
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Figure 2.6–figure supplement 2: The HDDM model fitting procedure does not introduce spurious
correlations between patch orientation and me value. Artificial sessions were simulated with fixed
me values (±0.1 for the two reward contexts) and different k values.
(A) Recovered k values from HDDM fitting closely matched k values used for the simulations.
(B) Recovered me values from HDDM fitting closely matched me values used for simulation and did not
correlate with RTrial patch orientation.

Third, the session-by-session adjustments in both me and z corresponded to
particular features of each monkey’s context-specific reward function. The shape of this
function, including the orientation of the plateau with respect to z and me, depended on
the monkey’s perceptual sensitivity and the reward ratio for the given session. The
monkeys’ me and z adjustments varied systematically with this orientation (Figure 2.6C
and D for RTrial, Figure 2.6–figure supplement 1C and D for RR). This result was not an
artifact of the fitting procedure, which was able to recover appropriate, simulated bias
parameter values regardless of the values of non-bias parameters that determine the
shape of the reward function (Figure 2.6–figure supplement 2).
Fourth, the monkeys’ me and z adjustments were correlated with the values that would
maximize RTrial, given the value of the other parameter for the given session and
reward context (Figure 2.6E for RTrial, Figure 2.6–figure supplement 1E for RR). These
correlations were substantially weakened by shuffling the session-by-session reward
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functions (Figure 2.6–figure supplement 3). Together, these results suggest that all three
monkeys used biases that were adaptively calibrated with respect to the reward
information and perceptual sensitivity of each session.

Figure 2.6–figure supplement 3. The correlation between fitted and conditionally optimal
adjustments was stronger for the real, session-by-session data (red lines) than for unmatched
(shuffled) sessions (bars).
(A, C) Momentary-evidence (me) adjustments. (B, D) Decision-rule (z) adjustments. A, B: optimal
values obtained with the RTrial function. C, D: optimal values obtained with the RR function. Red lines
indicate the partial Spearman correlation coefficients between the fitted and optimal me or z (obtained
in the same way as data in Figure 6E) for matched sessions. Bars represent the histograms of partial
correlation for unmatched sessions, which were obtained by 100 random shuffles of the sessions (i.e.,
comparing the optimal and best-fitting values from different sessions). Note that the histograms for the
unmatched sessions are centered at positive values, reflecting the non-session-specific tendency
of reward surfaces to skew towards overly biased me and z values. The correlation values for matched
sessions (red lines) are at even more positive values (Wilcoxson rank-sum test, p<0.001 for all three
monkeys and both me and z), suggesting additional session-specific tuning of
the me and z parameters.

The monkeys’ adaptive adjustments were consistent with a satisficing, gradientbased learning process
Thus far, we showed that all three monkeys adjusted their decision strategies in
a manner that matched many features of the optimal predictions based on their
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idiosyncratic, context-specific reward-rate functions. However, their biases did not match
the optimal predictions exactly. Specifically, all three monkeys used shifts in me favoring
the large-reward choice (adaptive direction) but of a magnitude that was larger than
predicted, along with shifts in z favoring the small-reward choice (non-adaptive
direction). We next show that these shifts can be explained by a model in which the
monkeys are initially over-biased, then adjust their model parameters to increase reward
and stop learning when the reward is high enough, but not at its maximum possible
value.
The intuition for this gradient-based satisficing model is shown in Figure 2.7. The
lines on the RTrial heatmap represent the trajectories of a gradient-tracking procedure
that adjusts me and z values to increase RTrial until a termination point (for illustration,
here we used 97% of the maximum possible value). Gradient lines are color-coded
based on how me and z values at the end points relate to the optimal me and z values.
For example, consider adjusting me and z by following all of the magenta gradient lines
until their endpoints. The lines are color-coded by me/z being adaptive vs. non-adaptive,
regardless of their relative magnitudes to the optimal values. In other words, as long as
the initial me and z values fall within the area covered by the magenta lines, the positive
gradient-tracking procedure would lead to a good-enough solution with over-shifted me
and non-adaptive z values similar to what we found in the monkeys’ data. Figure 2.7
also illustrates why assumptions about the starting point of this adaptive process are
important: randomly selected starting points would result in learned me and z values
distributed around the peak of the reward function, whereas the data (e.g., Figure 2.5C)
show distinct clustering that implies particular patterns of starting points.
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Figure 2.7. Relationships between starting and ending values of the satisficing, reward function
gradient-based updating process.
Example gradient lines of the average RTrial maps for the three monkeys are color coded based on the
end point of gradient-based me and z adjustments in the following
ways: 1) me biases to large reward whereas z biases to small reward (magenta); 2) z biases to large
reward whereas me biases to small reward (blue); 3) me and z both bias to large reward (green), and 4)
me and z both bias to small reward (yellow). The gradient lines ended on the 97% RTrial max contours.
Top row: LR-Left block; bottom row: LR-Right block.

We simulated this process using: 1) different starting points; 2) gradients defined
by the reward function derived separately for each reward context, session, and monkey;
and 3) a termination rule corresponding to achieving each monkey’s average reward in
that session (RTrialpredict) estimated from the corresponding best-fitting model parameters
and task conditions. This process is illustrated for LR-Left blocks in an example session
from monkey C (Figure 2.8A). We estimated the unbiased me and z values as the
midpoints between their values for LR-Left and LR-Right blocks (square). At this point,
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the RTrial gradient is larger along the me dimension than the z dimension, reflecting the
tilt of the reward function. We set the initial point at baseline z and a very negative value
of me (90% of the highest coherence used in the session; overshoot in the adaptive
direction) and referred to this setting as the “over-me” model. The me and z values were
then updated according to the RTrial gradient (see cartoon insert in Figure 2.8A), until
the monkey’s RTrialpredict or better was achieved (magenta trace and circle). The
endpoint of this updating process was very close to monkey C’s actual adjustment (gray
circle). For comparison, three alternative models are illustrated. The “over-z” model
selects z as the initial dimension and assumes updating from the baseline me and overadjusted z values (blue, initial z set as 0.1 for the LR-Left context and 0.9 for the LRRight context). The “over-both” model assumes updating from the over-adjusted me and
z values (green). The “neutral” model assumes the same updating process but from the
baseline me and baseline z (black). The endpoints from these alternative models
deviated considerably from the monkey’s actual adjustment.

Figure 2.7–figure
supplement 1. RR gradient
trajectories color-coded by
the end points of the me/z
patterns. Same format as
Figure 7 but using gradients
based on RR instead of
RTrial.
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Figure 2.8. The satisficing reward function gradient-based model.
A, Illustration of the procedure for predicting a monkey’s me and z values for a given RTrial function. For
better visibility, RTrial for the LR-Left reward context in an example session is shown as a heatmap in
greyscale. Gradient lines are shown as black lines. The square indicates the unbiased me and z
combination (average values across the two reward contexts). The four trajectories represent gradientbased searches based on four alternative assumptions of initial values (see table on the right). All four
searches stopped when the reward exceeded the average reward the monkey received in that session
(RTrialpredict), estimated from the corresponding best-fitting model parameters and task conditions. Open
circles indicate the end values. Grey filled circle indicates the monkey’s actual me and z. Note that the
end points differ among the four assumptions, with the magenta circle being the closest to the monkey’s
fitted me and z of that session.
B, Scatterplots of the predicted and actual me and z between reward contexts. Grey circles here are
the same as the black circles in Figure 4C. Colors indicate model identity, as in A.
C, Average regression coefficients between each monkey’s me (left four bars) and z (right four bars)
values and predicted values for each of the four models. Filled bars: t-test, p < 0.05.
D, Covariation of me (top) and z (bottom) with the orientation of the >97% RTrial heatmap patch for
monkeys and predictions of the four models. Blue: data from LR-Left blocks, red: data from LR-Right
blocks. Data in the “Monkey” column are the same as in Figure 6C and D. Note that predictions of the
“over-me” model best matched the monkey data than the other models.

The “over-me” model produced better predictions than the other three alternative
models for all three monkeys. Of the four models, only the “over-me” model captured the
monkeys’ tendency to bias me toward the large-reward choice (positive me) and bias z
toward the small-reward choice (negative z; Figure 8B). In contrast, the “over-z” model
predicted small adjustments in me and large adjustments in z favoring the large-reward
choice; the “over-both” model predicted relatively large, symmetric me and z
adjustments favoring the large-reward choice; and the “neutral” model predicted
relatively small, symmetric adjustments in both me and z favoring the large-reward
choice. Accordingly, for each monkey, the predicted and actual values of both me and
z were most strongly positively correlated for predictions from the “over-me” model
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compared to the other models (Figure 2.8C). The “over-me” model was also the only one
of the models we tested that recapitulated the measured relationships between both meand z-dependent biases and session-by-session changes in the orientation of the RTrial
function (Figure 2.8D). Similar results were observed using RR function (Figure 2.7–
figure supplement 1 and Figure 2.8–figure supplement 1). We also examined whether
the shape of the reward surface alone can explain the monkeys' bias patterns. We
repeated the simulations using randomized starting points, with or without additional
noise in each updating step. These simulations could not reproduce the monkeys' bias
patterns (data not shown), suggesting that using "over-me" starting points is critical for
accounting for the monkeys' suboptimal behavior.
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Figure 2.8–figure supplement 1. Predictions of a RR gradient-based model. Same format as Figure
8 but using gradients based on RR instead of RTrial. The overly-biased starting me and
z values were set as 90% of highest coherence level, and 0.1, respectively, except for the over-both
model for one monkey C session (me = 88% * max(coh), z = 0.11) to avoid a local peak in the RR
surface. Such local peaks at overly biased me and z values can divert the gradient-based updating
process to even more biased values without ever reaching the monkey's final RR (e.g., the green trace
at the bottom left corner in monkey C's LR-Left data in Figure 7–figure supplement 1).

Discussion
We analyzed the behavior of three monkeys performing a decision task that
encouraged the use of both uncertain visual motion evidence and the reward context. All
three monkeys made choices that were sensitive to the strength of the sensory evidence
and were biased toward the larger-reward choice, which is roughly consistent with
previous studies of humans and monkeys performing similar tasks (Maddox and Bohil,
1998; Voss et al., 2004; Diederich and Busemeyer, 2006; Liston and Stone, 2008;
Serences, 2008; Feng et al., 2009; Simen et al., 2009; Nomoto et al., 2010; Summerfield
and Koechlin, 2010; Teichert and Ferrera, 2010; Gao et al., 2011; Leite and Ratcliff,
2011; Mulder et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013; White and Poldrack, 2014).However, we
also found that these adjustments differed considerably in detail for the three monkeys,
in terms of overall magnitude, dependence on perceptual sensitivity and offered
rewards, and relationship to RTs. We quantified these effects with a logistic analysis and
a commonly used model of decision-making, the drift-diffusion model (DDM), which
allowed us to compare the underlying decision-related computations to hypothetical
benchmarks that would maximize reward. We found that all three monkeys made reward
context-dependent adjustments with two basic components: 1) an over-adjustment of the
momentary evidence provided by the sensory stimulus (me) in favor of the large-reward
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option; and 2) an adjustment to the decision rule that governs the total evidence needed
for each choice (z), but in the opposite direction (i.e., towards the small-reward option).
Similar to some earlier reports of human and monkey performance on somewhat similar
tasks, our monkeys did not optimize reward rate (Starns and Ratcliff, 2010 and 2012;
Teichert and Ferrera, 2010). Instead, these adjustments tended to provide nearly, but
not exactly, maximal reward intake. We proposed a common heuristic strategy based on
the monkeys’ individual reward functions to account for the idiosyncratic adjustments
across monkeys and across sessions within the same monkey.

Considerations for assessing optimality and rationality
Assessing decision optimality requires a model of the underlying computations.
In this study, we chose the DDM for several reasons. First, it provided a parsimonious
account of both the choice and RT data (Palmer et al., 2005; Ratcliff et al., 1999).
Second, as discussed in more detail below, the DDM and related accumulate-to-bound
models have provided useful guidance for identifying neural substrates of the decision
process (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Ding and Gold, 2010; Ding and Gold, 2012;
Hanks et al., 2011; Ratcliff et al., 2003; Rorie et al., 2010; Mulder et al., 2012;
Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010; Frank et al., 2015). Third, these models are closely
linked to normative theory, including under certain assumptions matching the statistical
procedure known as the sequential probability ratio test that can optimally balance the
speed and accuracy of uncertain decisions (Barnard, 1946; Wald, 1947; Wald and
Wolfowitz, 1948, Edward, 1965). These normative links were central to our ability to use
the DDM to relate the monkeys’ behavior to different forms of reward optimization. The
particular form of DDM that we used produced reasonably good, but not perfect, fits to
52

the monkeys’ data. These results support the utility of the DDM framework but also
underscore the fact that we do not yet know the true model, which could impact our
optimality assessment.
Assessing optimality also requires an appropriate definition of the optimization
goal. In our study, we mainly focused on the goal of maximizing reward rate (per trial or
per unit of time). Based on this definition, the monkeys showed suboptimal rewardcontext-dependent adjustments. It is possible that the monkeys’ were optimizing for a
different goal, such as accuracy or a competition between reward and accuracy
(“COBRA,” Maddox and Bohil, 1998). However, the monkeys’ behavior was not
consistent with optimizing for these goals, either. Specifically, none of these goals would
predict optimal z adjustment that favors the small reward choice: accuracy maximization
would require unbiased decisions (me=0 and z=0.5), whereas COBRA would require z
values with smaller magnitude (between 0.5 and those predicted for reward
maximization alone), but still in the adaptive direction. Therefore, the monkeys’
strategies were not consistent with simply maximizing commonly considered reward
functions.
Deviations from optimal behavior are often ascribed to a lack of effort or poor
learning. However, these explanations seem unlikely to be primary sources of
suboptimality in our study. For example, lapse rates, representing the overall ability to
attend to and perform the task, were consistently near zero for all three monkeys.
Moreover, the monkeys’ reward outcomes (RTrial or RR with respect to optimal values)
did not change systematically with experience but instead stayed close to the optimal
values. These results imply that the monkeys understood the task demands and
performed consistently well over the course of our study. Suboptimal performance has
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also been observed in human subjects, even with explicit instructions about the
optimality criteria (Starns and Ratcliff 2010, 2012), suggesting that additional factors
need to be considered to understand apparent suboptimality in general forms of
decision-making. More importantly, the monkeys made adjustments that were adapted
to changes in their idiosyncratic, context-dependent reward functions, which reflected
session-specific reward ratios and motion coherences and the monkeys’ daily variations
of perceptual sensitivity and speed-accuracy trade-offs (Figure 2.6, Figure 2.6–figure
supplement 1). Based on these observations, we reasoned that the seemingly suboptimal behaviors may instead reflect a common, adaptive, rational strategy that aimed
to attain good-enough (satisficing) outcomes.
The gradient-based, satisficing model we proposed was based on the
considerations discussed below to account for our results. We do not yet know how well
this model generalizes to other tasks and conditions, but it exemplifies an additional set
of general principles for assessing the rationality of decision-making behavior: goals that
are not necessarily optimal but good enough, potential heuristic strategies based on the
properties of the utility function, and flexible adaptation to changes in the external and
internal conditions.

Assumptions and experimental predictions of the proposed learning strategy
In general, finding rational solutions through trial-and-error or stepwise updates
requires a sufficient gradient in the utility function to drive learning (Sutton and Barto,
1998). Our proposed scheme couples a standard gradient-following algorithm with
principles that have been used to explain and facilitate decisions with high uncertainties,
time pressures, and/or complexity to achieve a satisficing solution (Simon, 1966;
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Wierzbicki, 1982; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997;
Goodrich et al., 1998; Sakawa and Yauchi, 2001; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002;
Stirling, 2003; Gigerenzer, 2010; Oh et al., 2016). This scheme complements but differs
from a previously proposed satisficing strategy to account for human subjects’
suboptimal calibration of the speed-accuracy trade-off via adjustments of the decision
bounds of a DDM that favor robust solutions given uncertainties about the inter-trial
interval (Zacksenhouse et al., 2010), In contrast, our proposed strategy focuses on
reward-biased behaviors for a given speed-accuracy tradeoff and operates on reward
per trial, which is, by definition, independent of inter-trial-interval.
Our scheme was based on four key assumptions, as follows. Our first key
assumption was that the starting point for gradient following was not the unbiased state
(i.e., me=0 and z=0.5) but an over-biased state. Notably, in many cases the monkeys
could have performed as well or better than they did, in terms of optimizing reward rate,
by making unbiased decisions. The fact that none did so prompted our assumption that
their session-by-session adjustments tended to reduce, not inflate, biases. Specifically,
we assumed that the initial experience of the asymmetric reward prompted an overreaction to bias choices towards the large-reward alternative. In general, such an initial
over-reaction is not uncommon, as other studies have shown excessive, initial biases
that are reduced or eliminated with training (Gold et al., 2008; Jones, et al., 2015;
Nikolaev et al., 2016). The over-reaction is also rational because the penalty is larger for
an under-reaction than for an over-reaction. For example, in the average RTrial
heatmaps for our task (Figure 2.6A), the gradient dropped faster in the under-biased
side than in the over-biased side. This pattern is generally true for tasks with sigmoid-like
psychometric functions (for example, the curves in Figure 2.2–figure supplement 2). Our
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model further suggests that the nature of this initial reaction, which may be driven by
individually tuned features of the reward function that can remain largely consistent even
for equal-reward tasks (Figure 2.8–figure supplement 2) and then constrain the endpoints of a gradient-based adjustment process (Figure 2.8), may help account for the
extensive individual variability in biases that has been reported for reward-biased
perceptual tasks (Voss et al., 2004; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010; Leite and Ratcliff,
2011; Cicmil et al., 2015)).

Figure 2.8–figure supplement 2. Dependence of the orientation and area of the near-optimal
RTrial patch on parameters reflecting internal decision process and external task specifications.
The top two rows show the RTrial heatmaps with two values of a single parameter indicated above,
while keeping the other parameters fixed at the baseline values. The third and fourth rows show the
estimated orientation (the amount of tilt from vertical, in degrees) and area (in pixels), respectively, of the
image patches corresponding to 97% of RTrialmax. The baseline values of the parameters are: a=1.5,
k=6, non-decision times=0.3 sec for both choices, ITI=4 sec, Timeout=8 sec, large-reward (LR): smallreward (SR) ratio=2.
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The specific form of initial over-reaction in our model, which was based on the
gradient asymmetry of the reward function, makes testable predictions. Specifically, our
data were most consistent with an initial bias in momentary evidence (me), which
caused the biggest change in the reward function. However, this gradient asymmetry
can change dramatically under different conditions. For example, changes in the
subject’s cautiousness (i.e., the total bound height parameter, a) and perceptual
sensitivity (k) would result in a steeper gradient in the other dimension (the decision rule,
or z) of the reward function (Figure 2.8–figure supplement 3). Our model predicts that
such a subject would be more prone to an initial bias along that dimension. This
prediction can be tested by using speed-accuracy instructions to affect the bound height
and different stimulus parameters to change perceptual sensitivity (Palmer et al 2005;
Gegenfurtner and Hawken, 1996).
Our second key assumption was that from this initial, over-biased state, the
monkeys made adjustments to both the momentary evidence (me) and decision rule (z)
that generally followed the gradient of the reward function. The proposed step-wise
adjustments occurred too quickly to be evident in behavior; e.g., the estimated biases
were similar for the early and late halves in a block (data not shown). Instead, our
primary support for this scheme was that the steady-state biases measured in each
session were tightly coupled to the shape of the reward function for that session. It would
be interesting to design tasks that might allow for more direct measurements of the
updating process itself, for example, by manipulating both the initial biases and relevant
reward gradient that might promote a longer adjustment process.
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Figure 2.8–figure supplement 3: The joint effect of DDM model parameters a (governing the
speed-accuracy trade-off) and k (governing perceptual sensitivity) on the shape of the reward
function.
(A, B) Example RTrial functions corresponding to steeper gradients along the z (panel A, corresponding
to the red points in panels C and D) or me (panel B, corresponding to the orange points in panels C and
D) dimension. The gradient lines (black) stop when RTrial >0.97 of the maximum value. A: a=1, k=5. B:
a=1, k=40. Large-reward:small-reward ratio = 2.
(C) Orientation of the patch corresponding to >0.97 maximal RTrial as a function of the product of a and
k.
(D) The ratio of the mean gradients along the me and z dimensions as a function of the product of a and
k. Our model assumes that the initial bias is along the dimension with the steeper gradient according to
each monkey’s idiosyncratic RTrial function. Note that because me and z have different units, the
boundary between initial-me and initial-z conditions may not correspond to a gradient ratio of 1.

Our third key assumption was that the shallowness of the utility of the function
around

the

peak

supported

satisficing

solutions.

Specifically,

gradient-based

adjustments, particularly those that use rapid updates based on implicit knowledge of the
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utility function, may be sensitive only to relatively large gradients. For our task, the
gradients were much smaller around the peak, implying that there were large ranges of
parameter values that provided such similar outcomes that further adjustments were not
used. In principle, it is possible to change the task conditions to test if and how subjects
might optimize with respect to steeper functions around the peak. For example, for
RTrial, the most effective way to increase the gradient magnitude near the peak (i.e.,
reducing the area of the dark red patch) is to increase sensory sensitivity (k) or
cautiousness (a; i.e., emphasizing accuracy over speed; Figure 2.8–figure supplement
2). For RR, the gradient can also be enhanced by increasing the time-out penalty.
Despite some practical concerns about these manipulations (e.g., increasing time-out
penalties can decrease motivation), it would be interesting to study their effects on
performance in more detail to understand the conditions under which satisficing or “good
enough” strategies are used (Simon, 1956; Simon, 1982).
Our last assumption was that the monkeys terminated adjustments as soon as
they reached a good-enough reward outcome. This termination rule produced end points
that approximated the monkeys’ behavior reasonably well. Other termination rules are
likely to produce similar end points. For example, the learning rate for synaptic weights
might decrease as the presynaptic and postsynaptic activities become less variable
(Aitchison et al., 2017; Kirkpatrick et al., 2017). In this scheme, learning gradually slows
down as the monkey approaches the plateau on the reward surface, which might
account for our results.
The satisficing reward gradient-based scheme we propose may further inform
appropriate task designs for future studies. For example, our scheme implies that the
shape of the reward function near the peak, particularly the steepness of the gradient,
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can have a strong impact on how closely a subject comes to the optimal solution for a
given set of conditions. Thus, task manipulations that affect the shape of the rewardfunction peak could, in principle, be used to control whether a study focuses on more- or
less-optimal behaviors (Figure 2.8–figure supplement 4). For example, increasing
perceptual sensitivity (e.g., via training) and/or decisions that emphasize accuracy over
speed (e.g., via instructions) tends to sharpen the peak of the reward function. According
to our scheme, this sharpening should promote increasingly optimal decision-making,
above and beyond the performance gains associated with increasing accuracy, because
the gradient can be followed closer to the peak of the reward function. The shape of the
peak is also affected by the reward ratio, such that higher ratios lead to larger plateaus,
i.e. shallower gradient, near the peak. This relationship leads to the idea that, all else
being equal, a smaller reward ratio may be more suitable for investigating principles of
near-optimal behavior, whereas a larger reward ratio may be more suitable for
investigating the source and principles of sub-optimal behaviors.
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Figure 2.8–figure supplement 4. Effects
of the shape of the reward function on
deviations from optimality.
(A) Illustration of our heuristic updating
model and measurement of deviation of the
end point from optimal. Yellow dot: optimal
solution. Gray lines: trajectory for gradient
ascent, ending at 0.97 maximal RTrial.
Black line: trajectory for updating from the
starting point (black dot, me=0.54, z=0.5),
which ended at 0.97 maximal RTrial (blue
dot). The deviation of the end point from
optimal is measured as the distance from
the yellow dot to the blue dot (yellow
dashed line). The same starting point and
ending criterion were used for data shown
in B and C.
(B) The area of the 0.97 maximal RTrial
plateau and end-point deviation from
optimal increase with reward ratio. The
product of a and k is fixed as 30.
(C) The area of the 0.97 maximal RTrial
plateau and end-point deviation from
optimal decrease with the product of a and
k. Reward ratio is fixed as 3.
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Possible neural mechanisms
The DDM framework has been used effectively to identify and interpret neural
substrates of key computational components of the decision process for symmetricreward versions of the motion-discrimination task. Our study benefitted from an RT task
design that provided a richer set of constraints for inferring characteristics of the
underlying decision process than choice data alone (Feng et al., 2009; Nomoto et al.,
2010; Teichert and Ferrera, 2010). The monkeys’ strategy further provides valuable
anchors for future studies of the neural mechanisms underlying decisions that are biased
by reward asymmetry, stimulus probability asymmetry, and other task contexts.
For neural correlates of bias terms in the DDM, it is commonly hypothesized that me
adjustments may be implemented as modulation of MT output and/or synaptic weights
for the connections between different MT subpopulations and decision areas (Cicmil, et
al., 2015). In contrast, z adjustments may be implemented as context-dependent
baseline changes in neural representations of the decision variable and/or contextdependent changes in the rule that determines the final choice (Lo and Wang, 2006;
Rao, 2010; Lo et al., 2015; Wei et al., 2015). The manifestation of these adjustments in
neural activity that encodes a decision variable may thus differ in its temporal
characteristics: a me adjustment is assumed to modulate the rate of change in neural
activity, whereas a z adjustment does not. However, such a theoretical difference can be
challenging to observe, because of the stochasticity in spike generation and, given such
stochasticity, practical difficulties in obtaining sufficient data with long decision
deliberation times. By adjusting me and z in opposite directions, our monkeys’ strategies
may allow a simpler test to disambiguate neural correlates of me and z. Specifically, a
neuron or neuronal population that encodes me may show reward modulation congruent
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with its choice preference, whereas a neuron or neuronal population that encodes z may
show reward modulation opposite to its choice preference (Figure 2.8–figure supplement
5). These predictions further suggest that, although it is important to understand if and
how human or animal subjects can perform a certain task optimally, for certain systemslevel questions, there may be benefits to tailoring task designs to promote sub-optimal
strategies in otherwise well-trained subjects.

Figure 2.8–figure supplement 5. Hypothetical neural activity encoding a reward-biased perceptual
decision variable. The blue and red curves depict rise-to-threshold dynamics in favor of a particular
(say, rightward) choice under the two reward contexts, as indicated. Note that when the rightward choice
is paired with larger reward: 1) the slope of the ramping process, which corresponds to an adjustment in
momentary evidence (me), is steeper; and 2) the baseline activity, which corresponds to the decisionrule (z) adjustment, is lower.
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Material and Methods
Subjects
We used three rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), two male and one female, to
study behavior on an asymmetric-reward reaction-time random-dot motion discrimination
task (Figure 1B, see below). Prior to this study, monkeys F and C had been trained
extensively on the equal-reward RT version of the task (Ding and Gold, 2010, 2012b, a).
Monkey A had been trained extensively on non-RT dots tasks (Connolly et al., 2009;
Bennur and Gold, 2011), followed by >130 sessions of training on the equal-reward RT
dots task. All training and experimental procedures were in accordance with the National
Institutes of Health Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and were
approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee (#804726).

Behavioral task
Our task (Figure 2.1B) was based on the widely used random-dot motion
discrimination task that typically has symmetric rewards (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002;
Ding and Gold, 2010). Briefly, a trial started with presentation of a fixation point at the
center of a computer screen in front of a monkey. Two choice targets appeared 0.5 s
after the monkey acquired fixation. After a delay, the fixation point was dimmed and a
random-dot kinematogram (speed: 6 /s) was shown in a 5 aperture centered on the
fixation point. For monkeys F and C, the delay duration was drawn from a truncated
exponential distribution with mean=0.7 s, max=2.5 s, min=0.4 s. For monkey A, the
delay was set as 0.75 s. The monkey was required to report the perceived global motion
direction by making a saccade to the corresponding choice target at a self-determined
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time (a 50-ms minimum latency was imposed to discourage fast guesses). The stimulus
was immediately turned off when the monkeys’ gaze left the fixation window (4, 4, and 3
square windows for monkey F, C, and A, respectively). Correct choices (i.e., saccades to
the target congruent with actual motion direction) were rewarded with juice. Error
choices were not rewarded and instead penalized with a timeout before the next trial
began (timeout duration: 3 s, 0.5-2 s, and 2.5 s, for monkeys F, C, and A, respectively).
On each trial, the motion direction was randomly selected toward one of the choice
targets along the horizontal axis. The motion strength of the kinematogram was
controlled as the fraction of dots moving coherently to one direction (coherence). On
each trial, coherence was randomly selected from 0.032, 0.064, 0.128, 0.256, and 0.512
for monkeys F and C, and from 0.128, 0.256, 0.512, and 0.75 for monkey A. In a subset
of sessions, coherence levels of 0.064, 0.09, 0.35, and/or 0.6 were also used for monkey
A.
We imposed two types of reward context on the basic task. For the “LR-Left”
reward context, correct leftward saccades were rewarded with a larger amount of juice
than correct rightward saccades. For the “LR-Right” reward context, correct leftward
saccades were rewarded with a smaller amount of juice than correct rightward
saccades. The large:small reward ratio was on average 1.34, 1.91, and 2.45 for
monkeys F, C, and A, respectively. Reward context was alternated between blocks and
constant within a block. Block changes were signaled to the monkey with an inter-block
interval of 5 s. The reward context for the current block was signaled to the monkey in
two ways: 1) in the first trial after a block change, the two choice targets were presented
in blue and green colors, for small and large rewards, respectively (this trial was not
included for analysis); and 2) only the highest coherence level (near 100% accuracy)
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was used for the first two trials after a block change to ensure that the monkey physically
experienced the difference in reward outcome for the two choices. For the rest of the
block, choice targets were presented in the same color and motion directions and
coherence levels were randomly interleaved.
We only included sessions in which there are more than 200 trials, more than 8
coherences and more than 8 trials for each coherence, motion direction and reward
context (61, 37 and 43 sessions for monkey F, C and A, respectively).

Basic characterization of behavioral performance
Eye position was monitored using a video-based system (ASL) sampled at 240
Hz. RT was measured as the time from stimulus onset to saccade onset, the latter
identified offline with respect to velocity (> 40/s) and acceleration (> 8000/s2).
Performance was quantified with psychometric and chronometric functions (Figure 2 and
Figure 3), which describe the relationship of motion strength (signed coherence, Coh,
which was the proportion of the dots moving in the same direction, positive for rightward
motion, negative for leftward motion) with choice and RT, respectively. Psychometric
functions were fitted to a logistic function (Equation (1)), in which 𝞴 is the error rate, or
lapse rate, independent of the motion information; 𝞪0 and (𝞪0 + 𝞪rew) are the bias terms,
which measures the coherence at which the performance was at chance level in the LRRight and LR-Left reward contexts, respectively. 𝞫0 and (𝞫0 + 𝞫rew) are the perceptual
sensitivities in the LR-Right and LR-Left reward contexts, respectively.
(1)

Reward-biased drift-diffusion model
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To infer the computational strategies employed by the monkeys, we adopted the
widely used accumulation-to-bound framework, the drift-diffusion model (DDM; Figure
1A). In the standard DDM, motion evidence is modeled as a random variable following a
Gaussian distribution with a mean linearly proportional to the signed coherence and a
fixed variance. The decision variable (DV) is modeled as temporal accumulation
(integral) of the evidence, drifting between two decision bounds. Once the DV crosses a
bound, evidence accumulation is terminated, the identity of the decision is determined by
which bound is crossed, and the decision time is determined by the accumulation time.
RT is modeled as the sum of decision time and saccade-specific non-decision times, the
latter accounting for the contributions of evidence-independent sensory and motor
processes.
To model the observed influences of motion stimulus and reward context on
monkeys’ choice and RT behavior, we introduced two reward context-dependent terms:
z specifies the relative bound heights for the two choices and me specifies the
equivalent momentary evidence that is added to the motion evidence at each
accumulating step. Thus, for each reward context, six parameters were used to specify
the decision performance: a: total bound height; k: proportional scaling factor converting
evidence to the drift rate; t0 and t1: non-decision times for leftward and rightward choices,
respectively; and z and me. Similar approaches have been used in studies of human
and animal decision making under unequal payoff structure and/or prior probabilities
(Voss et al., 2004; Bogacz et al., 2006; Diederich and Busemeyer, 2006; Summerfield
and Koechlin, 2010; Hanks et al., 2011; Mulder et al., 2012).
To fit the monkeys’ data, we implemented hierarchical DDM fitting using an opensource package in Python, which performs Bayesian estimates of DDM parameters
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based on single-trial RTs (Wiecki et al., 2013). This method assumes that parameters
from individual sessions are samples from a group distribution. The initial prior
distribution of a given parameter is determined from previous reports of human
perceptual performance and is generally consistent with monkey performance on equal
reward motion discrimination tasks (Ding and Gold, 2010; Matzke and Wagenmakers,
2009). The posterior distributions of the session- and group-level parameters are
estimated with Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling. The HDDM was fit to each monkey
separately.
For each dataset, we performed 5 chains of sampling with a minimum of 10000
total samples (range: 10000-20000; burn-in: 5000 samples) and inspected the trace,
autocorrelation and marginal posterior histogram of the group-level parameters to detect
signs of poor convergence. To ensure similar level of convergence across models, we
computed the Gelman-Rubin statistic (R-hat) and only accepted fits with R-hat<1.01.
To assess whether reward context modulation of both z and me was necessary to
account for monkeys’ behavioral data, we compared fitting performance between the
model with both terms (“full”) and reduced models with only one term (“z-only” and “meonly”). Model selection was based on the deviance information criterion (DIC), with a
smaller DIC value indicating a preferred model. Because DIC tends to favor more
complex models, we bootstrapped the expected DIC values, assuming the reduced
models were the ground truth, using trial-matched simulations. For each session, we
generated simulated data using the DDM, with single-session parameters fitted by meonly or z-only HDDM models and with the number of trials for each direction 
coherence  reward context combination matched to the monkey’s data for that session.
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These simulated data were then re-fitted by all three models to estimate the predicted
DIC, assuming the reduced model as the generative model.
To test an alternative model, we also fitted monkeys’ data to a DDM with
collapsing bounds (Zylberberg et al., 2016). This DDM was constructed as the expected
first-stopping-time distribution given a set of parameters, using the PyMC module
(version 2.3.6) in Python (version 3.5.2). The three model variants, “full”, “me-only” and
“z-only”, and their associated parameters were the same as in HDDM, except that the
total bound distance decreases with time. The distance between the two choice bounds
was set as

of collapsing, and

, where

is the initial bound distance,

determines the rate

determines the onset of the collapse. Fitting was performed by

computing the maximum a posteriori estimates, followed by Markov chain Monte Carlo
sampling, of DDM parameters given the experimental RT data.

Sequential analysis
To examine possible sequential choice effects, for each monkey and session we
fitted the choice data to three logistic functions. Each function was in the same form as
equation (1) but with one of four possible additional terms describing a sequential effect
based on whether the previous trial was correct or not, and whether the previous trial
was to the large or small reward target. The sequential effect was assessed via a
likelihood-ratio test for H0: the sequential term in Eq. (2)=0, p<0.05
(2)
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Biasseq was determined using indicator variables for the given sequential effect and the
reward context (e.g., LR-Right context, previous correct LR choice): Iseq

Irew 𝞪seq, where

Irew = +/-1 for LR-Right / LR-Left reward contexts.
Iseq = IprevLR-prevCorrect, IprevLR-prevError, IprevSR-prevCorrect, and IprevSR-prevError for the 4 types of
sequential effects (note that there were not enough trials to compute previous error SR
choice).

Optimality analysis
To examine the level of optimality of the monkeys’ performance, we focused on
two reward functions: reward rate (RR, defined as the average reward per second) and
reward per trial (RTrial, defined as the average reward per trial) for a given reward
context for each session. To estimate the reward functions in relation to me and z
adjustments for a given reward context, we numerically obtained choice and RT values
for different combinations of z (ranging from 0 to 1) and me (ranging from -0.6 to 0.6
coherence unless otherwise specified), given a, k and non-decision time values fitted by
the full model. We then calculated RR and RTrial, using trial-matched parameters,
including the actual ITI, timeout, and large:small reward ratio. RRmax and RTrialmax were
identified as the maximal values given the sampled me-z combinations, using 1000 trials
for each coherence  direction condition. Optimal me and z adjustments were defined as
the me and z values corresponding to RRmax or RTrialmax. RRpredict and RTrialpredict were
calculated with the fitted me and z values in the full model.
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CHAPTER 3: NEURAL REPRESENTATION OF SENSORY AND REWARD
INFORMATION IN THE CAUDATE NUCLEUS IN REWARD-BIASED
PERCEPTUAL DECISION-MAKING

Yunshu Fan, Takahiro Doi, Joshua I. Gold, Long Ding

Part of this chapter is from a manuscript on BioRxiv: Doi T, Fan Y, Gold JI, Ding L (2019) The
caudate nucleus controls coordinated patterns of adaptive, context-dependent adjustments to
complex decisions. doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/568733

Introduction
Decision-making is a complex process in which both human and animals have to
combine different sources of information, such as noisy sensory evidence and
preference for a certain option, in appropriate ways to obtain the outcome that the
satisfies the decision-maker. Previous studies have provided many insights into the
kinds of computations underlying such adaptive decision-making process, including the
ones I described in Chapter 2 (Maddox and Bohil, 1998; Voss et al., 2004; Diederich and
Busemeyer, 2006; Whiteley and Sahani, 2008; Liston and Stone, 2008; Feng et al.,
2009; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010; Gao et al., 2011; Leite and Ratcliff, 2011;
Mulder et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2018; Waiblinger et al., 2019). However, it remains
unclear where and how these computations are implemented in the brain.
A prime candidate for mediating these computations is the basal ganglia
pathway, which has been a focus of many modeling studies (Redgrave et al., 1999;
Bogacz and Gurney, 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Rao, 2010; Ratcliff and Frank,
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2012; Summerfield and Tsetsos, 2012; Ding and Gold, 2013; Hikosaka et al., 2014).
This pathway is known to make separate contributions to perceptual decisions based on
the interpretation of uncertain sensory evidence and value-based decisions that select
among outcome options (Hikosaka et al., 1989; Nakamura and Hikosaka, 2006;
Samejima and Doya, 2007; Lau and Glimcher, 2008; Kimchi and Laubach, 2009; Ding
and Gold, 2010, 2012a; Cai et al., 2011; Cavanagh et al., 2011; Seo et al., 2012;
Tachibana and Hikosaka, 2012; Tai et al., 2012; Kim and Hikosaka, 2013; Santacruz et
al., 2017; Wang et al., 2018; Yartsev et al., 2018). However, its role in combining those
different sources of information remains speculative.
To begin to investigate this problem, we performed single-unit extracellular
recordings in the caudate nucleus, the input station in the basal ganglia, while monkeys
were performing the reward-biased visual motion discrimination task that we used in
Chapter 2. In this chapter, I will focus on task- and decision-related information carried
by the caudate nucleus before, during and after decision, and how they contribute to the
reward-biased decision behavior.

Results
We trained two monkeys to perform the same random-dot visual motion direction
discrimination task as described in Chapter 2 (Figure 3.1 A). Both monkeys showed
similar reward-biased behaviors as described in Chapter 2 (Figure 3.1 B). While the
monkeys were doing the task, we recorded extracellularly from 142 well-isolated units in
the caudate nucleus. For data analyses, we divided the task into 7 over-lapping epochs
(indicated by the colored bars below the task timeline): 3 epochs before the sensory
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stimulus presentation (blue), 2 epochs during decision-making (green) and 2 postdecision epochs (orange and red).

Figure 3.1 Monkeys showed biases toward choices associated with large reward.
(A) Task design and timeline. Monkeys reported the perceived motion direction with saccades to one of
the two choice targets. The motion stimulus was turned off upon detection of saccade. Correct trials
were rewarded based on the reward context. Error trials were not rewarded. The color bars in the
timeline indicate epoch definitions for the regression analysis of neural firing rates in Eq. 1.
(B) Average choice behavior of two monkeys (n = 17,493 trials from 38 sessions for monkey C, 29,599
trials from 79 sessions for monkey F). Filled and open circles: data from the two reward contexts. Lines:
logistic fits.
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Before sensory stimulus presentation, caudate neurons represent reward-context
information.
The behavioral task we used was setup so that the reward context (i.e., which
target is associated with large/small reward) was cued by the colors of the two choice
targets (blue/green indicated large/small reward) before the starting of a block. Once the
block started, the color cues were removed and two identical red choice targets
appeared. This protocol required the monkeys to remember the reward context of the
block in order to combine this information appropriately with the sensory information
presented in each trial. Within each block, the reward context remained the same from
trial to trial, which implies that the information about the reward context should be
present even before the onset of visual stimulus.
We found that 26% of the 142 caudate neurons that we recorded showed
selective preference for one of the reward contexts (beta coefficient of the rewardcontext regressor being significant in Eq. 1, t-test, p<0.05), including 11% that were
more active in the block in which the contralateral correct choice was paired with large
reward (such as the example neuron in Figure 3.2 A), and 15% that were more active in
the block where the ipsilateral correct choice is paired with large reward (such as the
example neuron in Figure 3.2 B). The proportion of reward-context modulation is higher
than chance level, which is 5%.
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Figure 3.2 Reward context representations before visual stimulus onset.
(A, B) Activity of two example units before visual stimulus onset. Lines: average firing rate of all trials
belonging to each of the two reward contexts. Firing rates were computed using a 200 ms running
window (50-ms steps). Ribbon: standard error. Colors: reward context. Note that the neuron in (A)
showed preference for the reward context where contralateral target is paired with large reward; the
neuron in (B) showed preference for the other reward context.
(C) Fraction of neurons representing the two reward contexts or not carrying reward context
information. Total number of neurons: 142. Reward context-representing neurons were identified as
having significant coefficient (t-test; p<0.05) for the reward context regressor in the linear regression
(Eq.1 in Materials and Methods).

Reward context-dependent pre-decision activity has been reported previously
(Lauwereyns et al., 2002; Ding and Hikosaka, 2006). In the study by Ding and Hikosaka,
monkeys were asked to make either a contralateral or an ipsilateral saccade toward the
previously cued position (memory guided saccade (MGS) task). They used the same
block-wise design of asymmetric-reward paradigm as in our task. They found that ~30%
of caudate neurons recorded showed preference for one of the two reward context, and
there were similar proportions of neurons preferring each reward contexts. These
findings are consistent with ours. Lauwereyns and colleagues used the asymmetricreward design in a visually guided saccade (VGS) task, in which the monkey simply
needed to look at the target located either on the contralateral or the ipsilateral side. The
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VGS task is mentally less challenging than the MGS task because the monkeys do not
need to remember the saccade target location. Lauwereyns and colleague found a
higher proportion of neurons showing pre-decision reward context modulation (76%) and
most of those neurons preferred the context in which the contralateral target is paired
with reward (they used reward/no reward, rather than large/small reward). The
differences in percentage of reward context-modulated neurons reported by these three
studies might due to differences in recording locations and/or sampling bias: for
example, neurons active in the VGS task and are modulated by reward context might not
be active in the MGS task or in our task. It is also possible that when a task is more
cognitively demanding, the proportion of neurons representing the two reward-location
associations might be more balanced.
In the two previous studies, the neural activity representing reward context
information tended to ramp up until the saccade location cue appeared. We saw similar
ramping activity in only 33% neurons based on visual inspection (e.g. Figure 3.2 A and
Figure 3.2-figure supplement 1 A and F), but we also saw other patterns (e.g. Figure 3.2
B and Figure 3.2-figure supplement 1 B-E and G-I). A difference between our study and
theirs is that, in their studies, the pre-cue period was fixed, so that the monkey could
predict when the cue would be turned on, whereas in our study, that period was varied.
This might contribute to a lack of consistent ramping pattern.
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Figure 3.2-figure supplement 1. Diverse temporal dynamics of reward context representations
before visual stimulus onset.
(A) - (I) Activity of example units before visual stimulus onset. Same format as (A) and (B) in Figure 3.2.
Top and bottom rows are neurons representing the two reward contexts. Note that neurons in (A) and
(F) showed the classical ramping pattern. Neurons in other panels did not show ramping pattern.

In an earlier study using the equal-reward version of our motion-direction
discrimination task, caudate neural activity before stimulus onset was shown to correlate
with the monkeys’ bias towards a specific choice, in both correct and error trials(Ding
and Gold, 2010). The correlation was stronger in low coherence trials, because those
were the trials where pre-decision bias was less influenced by sensory information. Their
results suggested that caudate might encode a choice-bias signal for the monkeys’
upcoming decision. We examined whether the choice-bias signal also existed in the
caudate pre-stimulus activity in our task using multiple linear regression (Eq.1) in low
coherence correct and error trials separately. We found only 1 neuron whose prestimulus activity showed significant choice modulation in both correct and error trials.
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This suggests that when the monkeys’ bias is more reward-driven, caudate pre-stimulus
activity appears to represent the reward context, rather than choice bias.
To summarize, caudate neurons can represent reward context information in
some neurons before the onset of the sensory stimulus. This reward context information
can be used to develop a bias towards the larger reward option, and bias the upcoming
decision process, similar to the bias in the starting point of evidence accumulation. We
found that the proportions of neurons representing each reward contexts were similar. In
the basal ganglia, there are direct and indirect pathways that drive and suppress basal
ganglia output, respectively (Purves, 2001). In the context of our results, it is possible
that neurons representing the two reward contexts belong to the two separate pathways.
Consequently, at the output station of basal ganglia, such as the substantia nigra pas
reticulate (SNr) or the Globus Pallidus internal (GPi), the two pathways form a
unidirectional bias to increase or decrease the starting point of evidence accumulation in
the two reward contexts. Alternatively, if there are two accumulators for evidence
supporting each choice, each of the accumulators could receive the information only
from neurons representing one of the reward contexts.

During motion-viewing, caudate neurons represent choice, coherence, reward size
and reward context.
During the motion-viewing period, the monkeys were receiving sensory
information about motion direction and strength and they combined that with the reward
bias established by the reward context to form their decisions. Because we cued the
monkey about the reward context in each block, as a decision is formed, the size of the
reward associated with the choice would also be known. We assessed whether a neuron
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carries information about the motion strength (i.e., coherence), the reward context, the
monkey’s choice and the reward size associated with the choice (“reward size” for
short), using a multiple linear regression (Eq. 2).
We found that, during this period, the information about reward context was still
represented in a significant proportion of caudate neurons (second row in Figure 3.3 A:
the proportions of neurons with significant reward context-modulation (green line and
circle) during the two motion-viewing epochs were above chance level (dashed line)).
Reward context-modulation in some neurons was so obvious that one can deduce
reward context change simply from the raw raster plot (two example neurons are shown
in Figure 3.3-figure supplement 1).
Representation about the motion coherence, choice and reward size information
also emerged during this period (Figure 3.3 A: the proportions of neurons with significant
modulation by coherence (third row), choice (first row) and reward size (blue line in the
second row) during the two motion-viewing epochs were above chance level (dashed
line)). The information was represented in more neurons in the later decision epoch (light
green) than in the early decision epoch (dark green), consistent with the accumulation of
sensory evidence and gradual formation of a decision (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002;
Kiani et al., 2008; Yartsev et al., 2018).
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Figure 3.3 Caudate activity reflected motion strength, reward context, choice, and the expected
reward size associated with the choice.
(A-D) Fractions of neurons showing significant coefficients for task-related regressors in the seven task
epochs defined in Figure 3.1 A (see Eq. 2 for the formulation of regression). Horizontal dashed lines:
chance levels. Coh: activity with non-zero coefficients for unsigned coherence values. Coh × Reward:
activity with non-zero coefficients for the coherence × reward size interaction. Coh + Reward: activity
with non-zero coefficients for coherence on trials with either choice and non-zero coefficients for either
reward context or reward size.
(E, F) Activity of two example neurons. Shades: coherence levels. Colors: reward context (A) and
reward size (B). Firing rates were computed using a 200 ms running window (50-ms steps). Only correct
trials were included.
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Figure 3.3-figure supplement 1. Example neurons with reward context modulation.
Rasters of the spiking activity of two example neurons. Cyan and red indicat transitions from Contralarge reward context to Ipsi-large rewrd context and from Contra-large reward context to Ipsi-large rewrd
context, respectively. It is obvious that the neuron on the left is more active in Ipsi-large reward context;
the neuron on the right is more active in Contra-large reward context. The change in neural activity
coincided well with block transitions in both neurons.

During motion-viewing: sensory and reward information are combined in some
individual caudate neurons, but not in the format of decision variable.
Previous studies have established the role of caudate nucleus in evidence
accumulation, reward processing and decision formation (Nakamura and Hikosaka,
2006; Ding and Gold, 2010, 2012a; Yartsev et al., 2018). Are sensory information and
reward-related information combined in individual caudate neurons? To answer this
question, we searched for neurons with joint modulation by coherence and either reward
context or reward size.
We found that many neurons with such joint modulation (Figure 3.3 E and F,
Figure 3.3-figure supplement 2 A-C). For example, the activity of the neuron depicted in
Figure 3.3E showed three types of modulation: 1) more activity during the blocks when
the contralateral choice was paired with small reward and the ipsilateral choice was
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paired with large reward (green > purple); 2) more activity for trials with stronger versus
weaker motion evidence (dark shade > light shade; i.e., higher versus lower coherence
levels, respectively), particularly for trials with contralateral choices; and 3) more activity
for trials with contralateral versus ipsilateral choices, both during motion viewing and
around saccade onset (Contra > Ipsi). This neuron’s activity thus reflected a combination
of reward context, motion strength, and eventual choice. The example neuron depicted
in Figure 3.3F showed: 1) more activity on trials with higher coherence levels (dark
shade > light shade); 2) a contralateral choice preference, both during motion viewing
and around saccade onset (Contra > Ipsi); and 3) more activity when the choice was
associated with large reward (red > blue). This neuron’s activity thus reflected choice,
the strength of motion stimulus leading to the choice and the reward size expected for
the choice. In the caudate population, the presence of neurons with the joint modulation
was also above chance level (Figure 3.3 D). This suggests that, sensory information and
reward information are combined in some individual caudate neurons.
The combination of sensory and non-sensory information has been found in
other brain areas, such as the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) (Rorie et al., 2010; Hanks et
al., 2011). Hanks and colleagues found that LIP neural activity during decision-formation
combined motion-direction evidence and the prior about how often the two alternatives
could occur. Rorie and colleague found that LIP neural activity during decision-formation
combined coherence and reward sizes of different options, similar to what we found in
the caudate nucleus. In both studies, the LIP activity resembled the decision variable in
the “accumulation to bound” framework. Is it possible that the caudate neural activity
during decision formation also represents the decision variable?
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Figure 3.3-figure supplement 2: Example neurons with different kinds of task-relevant
modulations.
Same format as Figure 3.3E and F. Bars above the curves indicate the epochs used for regression
analysis results. Regression coefficients for each epoch are shown on the right. Bold: t-test, p<0.05.
Note that colors indicate reward contexts in A-C and reward size in D-E.
(A) A neuron with activity modulated by choice and coherence, but not reward-related quantities, during
motion viewing.
(B) A neuron with activity modulated by choice, reward context, expected reward size, coherence, and
coherence-reward size interaction in trials with ipsilateral choices.
(C) A neuron with different modulation patterns for activity during and after motion viewing.
(D) A neuron with post-decision activity modulated by choice, expected reward size and coherence.
(E) A neuron with post-decision activity modulated by choice and coherence-reward size interaction in
trials with ipsilateral choices.

A feature of decision variable in reaction time task is that, it converges to a
common bound regardless of the sensory evidence strength (illustrated in Figure 3.3figure supplement 3 A). Therefore, neural correlates of a decision variable should have
neural activity reaching a common level when aligned to decision onset, such as
reported from some neurons in LIP and in the frontal eye field (FEF) (Roitman and
Shadlen, 2002; Ding and Gold, 2012b). However, we did not find this pattern in the 44
caudate neurons with joint modulation by coherence and reward based on the visual
inspection of the neural activity (e.g. Figure 3.3 E and F, Figure 3.3-figure supplement
C). The absence of the converge-to-bound pattern is consistent with a previous study
using the same motion discrimination task but with equal reward (Ding and Gold, 2010).
This suggests that sensory evidence and reward information are combined in the
caudate nucleus but not in the format of decision variable. So what might be the function
of such caudate neurons that combine sensory and reward information?

93

Figure 3.3-figure supplement 3: Comparison between decision variable and caudate neural
activity.
(A) Simulated decision variable aligned to decision onset.
(B) Example neural activity aligned to saccade onset. Same neuron as in Figure 3.3 E.

The combination of sensory and reward information by the caudate neurons
might play an important role in the reward-biased perceptual decision-making process.
To explore this, in a subsequent study, we applied electric micro-stimulation to the
caudate nucleus during the motion-viewing epoch (Doi et al., 2019). The microstimulation induced changes in the decision behavior that were different in the two
reward contexts, suggesting that caudate neural activities during decision-making
directly influences how sensory and reward information are combined. Further modeling
analyses of the data showed that the micro-stimulation effect could be explained by
coordinated changes in the drift-rate and the decision rule in the accumulation-to-bound
framework. Taken together, these results suggest that the caudate nucleus does not
represent the decision variable that directly links evidence accumulation to specific
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decisions, but rather modulates the kinds and magnitudes of biases and eventually
shapes the decisions.

Post-decision: sensory and reward information remains combined in caudate
neurons, possibly for decision evaluation.
During the decision formation epoch, we found that the caudate nucleus
represented decision-related information, such as coherence, reward context, choice
and reward size. In the post-decision period, this information was still represented and
by even larger proportion of caudate neurons (Figure 3.3 A: peri-saccade (orange) and
post-saccade (red) epochs). The proportion of neurons with joint modulation by reward
and coherence was also slightly larger in the post-decision period than in the predecision period (57 and 62 for the peri- and post-saccade epochs, respectively,
compared to 44 for the decision epoch). Of these neurons, 38% (in both peri- and postsaccade epochs) preferred high coherence for one choice and low coherence for the
other (e.g. Figure 3.3-figure supplement 1 C), providing a memory of the amount of
evidence supporting the specific choice. The other 62% preferred high or low coherence
for both choices (e.g. Figure 3.3 F and Figure 3.3-figure supplement 1 D). These
neurons could reflect the difficulty of the decision, because task difficulty is independent
of the specific choice being made. This kind of choice-independent coherencemodulation is consistent with the finding in a previous study using the equal-reward
version of the same task. In addition, we found that, during this time period, a significant
population of caudate neurons also represented the reaction time (RT) of the decision
(Figure 3.4). Because reaction time is modulated by both coherence and reward size
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(Chapter 2), these results suggest that sensory evidence and reward information were
combined in the post-decision caudate neural activity as well.
Figure 3.4 Reaction time (RT) is
represented in caudate latedecision and post-decision
activities.
Top: Same timeline as in Figure 3.1
Bottom: Fractions of neurons
showing significant coefficients for
RT-related regressors in the seven
task epochs (see Eq. 3 for the
formulation of regression).
Horizontal dashed lines: chance
levels.
Note that large proportion of
caudate neurons showing RTmodulation in epoch 5, 6 and 7.

Unlike the neural activity during decision-making, post-decision activity could no
longer influence the current decision. However, our results, as well those from several
other studies, have found that caudate nucleus continues representing task- and
behavior-related variables after decisions, such as task difficulty and choice value (Lau
and Glimcher, 2008; Ding and Gold, 2010; Yanike and Ferrera, 2014). It is possible that
information represented during this period could be used for behavioral monitoring and
evaluation.
This hypothesis is plausible, because the choice-independent coherence
modulation, described in the paragraph above, could provide information about task
difficulty, which is important for evaluation. In RT task, decision accuracy has been found
to decrease with decision time, because longer decision times tend to associated with
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more difficult trials(Hanks et al., 2011). Therefore, the RT-modulated neurons could
provide information about decision accuracy. In addition, reward expectation could be
computed by combining decision accuracy with the reward size of the choice (which can
be provided by the reward size-modulated neurons). In sum, sensory evidence and
reward information were combined in individual caudate neurons, which could be used
for decision evaluation.

Discussion
We recorded neural activity in the caudate nucleus of two monkeys making
reward-biased perceptual decisions. We found that multiple task- and decision-related
features were represented before, during and after the decision. The emergence of
these features was consistent with the timeline of the task. For example, reward context
was always available throughout the trial, and we found reward context-representation
before, during and after the decision. Motion coherence was only represented after
motion stimulus onset. Choice and its associated reward size representations emerged
as sensory evidence was accumulated and combined with reward information to form a
decision.
We also found single neurons that jointly represented sensory and reward
information both during and after decision, which supports the hypothesis that caudate
combines multiple sources of information in support of a choice.

Information representation before stimulus onset
We found that before the presentation of sensory information, caudate nucleus
represented the reward context information, a phenomenon that has also been observed
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in other studies with a similar block-design for reward context manipulation (Lauwereyns
et al., 2002; Ding and Hikosaka, 2006). This reward context information could be used to
establish a bias in the baseline of evidence accumulation, similar to changing the
starting value or decision threshold in the accumulation-to-bound model. In the context
of the computational model, similar bias (prior) has been shown to be induced by
manipulating stimulus probability (Hanks et al., 2011; Mulder et al., 2012), although
those studies have not recorded from caudate neurons during such manipulation. It
would be interesting to know whether the caudate nucleus only represents rewardrelated bias or could also represent sensory prior.

Information representation during decision
During decision, we found that sensory evidence and reward information are
combined in the caudate nucleus, which could be used for decision formation.
Subsequent micro-stimulation experiments have confirmed the direct involvement of
caudate nucleus in combining sensory and reward information when making complex
decisions(Doi et al., 2019). However, as shown in the results section, the activity of
caudate neurons that jointly represented sensory evidence and reward information did
not resemble a decision variable that directly links evidence accumulation with specific
decisions. Meanwhile, other brain areas in the parietal and prefrontal cortex have been
found to compute decision variables that represent the combination of sensory and nonsensory information. In monkeys, decision variable-like signals that combines sensory
evidence with reward-bias or prior, have been found in area LIP(Rorie et al., 2010;
Hanks et al., 2011). In human, Model-based fMRI studies found decision variable-like
BOLD signals in areas like the inferior parietal lobule, superior parietal lobule, lateral
98

frontopolar and orbitofrontal cortices, although without the temporal precision of singleunit recording(Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010).
From these findings, it appears that the decision-making process is complex and
involves multiple brain areas. Our results suggest that the role of the caudate nucleus
might be to encode non-decision variable information. Such signals could then modulate
the balance between sensory evidence and reward bias and influence the evolution of
decision variables in other parts of the brain.

Information representation after decision
We found that after a decision was made, sensory and reward information were
still represented in the caudate nucleus. Such information can no longer influence the
current decision, but they might be used for decision performance evaluation. Examples
of such evaluation include: (a) computation of task difficulty from neurons with
coherence-modulation; (b) computation of decision accuracy from neurons with RTmodulation and (c) computation of reward expectation from neurons with both
coherence- and reward-modulation.
In other brain areas, some post-action neural activities have been previously
reported to represent performance monitoring quantities. For example, in the frontal eye
field, some neurons’ post-decision activity was found to correlate with the correctness
and difficulty of current trials in a speed categorization task (Teichert et al., 2014). In a
motor learning task, the post-action neural activity in monkey area LIP was found to
encode the error of the motor execution(Zhou et al., 2016). Post-decision neural activity
in monkey ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) was found to encode information
related to the current decision as well as choice bias in the next decision in an auditory
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decision task(Tsunada et al., 2019). Peri-action activity in the prelimbic region of rat
medial prefrontal cortex (PL) correlated with expected value(Lak et al., 2019). In both
monkey vlPFC and rat PL, perturbing the neural activity via microstimulation and
optogenetic silencing, respectively, did not influence the current decision, but influenced
behavior in subsequent trials, suggesting that these monitoring signal might guide
behavioral adjustments in the future. It is possible that, like these brain areas, the
caudate post-decision activity might be used for evaluating current performance and
adjusting future actions.
In the next chapter, I will examine this hypothesis in detail by focusing on
whether and how caudate post-decision activity might represent two evaluative
quantities—confidence and reward expectation.

Materials and methods
Subjects
Two of the three monkeys in Chapter 2 (monkey C and monkey F) were used for the
experiments in this Chapter.
Behavioral task
Same as described in Chapter 2.
Data acquisition
Eye position was monitored using a video-based system (ASL) sampled at 240 Hz.
Single-unit recordings focused on putative project neurons (Ding and Gold, 2010). We
searched for task-relevant neurons while the monkeys performed the equal-reward
motion discrimination task with horizontal dots motions and determined the presence of
task-related modulation of neural activity by visual and audio inspection of ~10–20 trials.
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For analyses of neural response properties in recording sessions, only well-isolated
single units were included. Neural signals were amplified, filtered and stored using a
MAP acquisition system (Plexon, Inc.), along with time-stamped event codes, analog
eye position signals and trial parameter values. Single unit activity was identified by
offline spike sorting (Offline Sorter, Plexon, Inc.).
Neural data analysis
For each single unit dataset, we computed the average firing rates in seven task epochs
(Figure 3.1A): three epochs before motion stimulus onset (400 ms window beginning at
target onset, variable window from target onset to dots onset, and 400 ms window
ending at motion onset), two epochs during motion viewing (a fixed window from 100
ms after motion onset to 100 ms before median RT and a variable window from 100 ms
after motion onset to 100 ms before saccade onset), a peri-saccade 300 ms window
beginning at 100 ms before saccade onset, and a post-saccade 400 ms window
beginning at saccade onset (before feedback and reward delivery).

Identify reward context modulation before motion stimulus onset (Figure 3.2):
For each unit, the following multiple linear regression was performed on the average
firing rates in epoch 2 in all trials.

(Eq.1)
where

,

,
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Significance of non-zero coefficients was assessed using t-test (criterion: p=0.05).

Identify directly measured decision-related modulations (Figure 3.3 A):
For each unit, the following multiple linear regression was performed on the average
firing rates in correct trials for each task epoch separately.

,

(Eq. 2)
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Significance of non-zero coefficients was assessed using t-test (criterion: p=0.05).

Identify RT-related modulations (Figure 3.4):
For each unit, the following multiple linear regression was performed on the average
firing rates in all trials for each task epoch separately.

(Eq. 3)
where

,

,

,

,

and

.

Significance of non-zero coefficients was assessed using t-test (criterion: p=0.05).
RT-modulated neurons were identified as neurons with significant 𝞫RTContra , 𝞫RTIpsi,
𝞫RewRTContra or 𝞫RewRTIpsi.
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Behavioral analysis
A logistic function was fitted to the choice data for all trials:
,

Where

(Eq. 4)

is the signed motion coherence,

,

,

,
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CHAPTER 4: CONFIDENCE AND REWARD EXPECTATION ARE
REPRESENTED IN CAUDATE POST-DECISION ACTIVITY

Yunshu Fan, Takahiro Doi, Joshua I. Gold, Long Ding

Introduction
In chapter 3, I discussed the possibility that the caudate post-decision activity
could carry information for decision monitoring and evaluation. In this chapter, I will focus
on examining whether the caudate neurons could represent two specific evaluative
quantities – confidence and reward expectation.
Confidence is the subjective belief, prior to feedback, that a decision is correct
(Kiani et al., 2014). It is particularly relevant in the context of making a decision based on
unreliable or noisy evidence, and it could influence how to act subsequently upon the
current decision. For example, I see a dark patch on the ground in front of me. Knowing
that my eyesight is very good, I decide quite confidently that it is some darker-colored
soil, not a puddle of water, so I know stepping on it would be fine. If my eyesight is pretty
bad, after staring at it for a while, I might still reach the same conclusion, but my
confidence of that conclusion would be quite low, and I might recommend people to
jump over it, in case it is a puddle of water. Studies on confidence in monkeys making
categorical judgement on noisy sensory stimulus usually set up as such: in some trials,
in addition to the two perceptual categories, monkeys were given the chance to choose
a third safe option that guarantees a reward smaller than the amount they would get if
they pick the correct choice. They found that those monkeys were more likely to choose
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the option with the guaranteed smaller reward when the monkeys were less confident
about the stimuli (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Fetsch et al., 2014). Other studies in both
monkeys and rats found that they were more likely to abort an uncertain decision in
order to reinitiate a new trial (Kepecs et al., 2008; Yanike and Ferrera, 2014). Postdecision confidence could provide information about how the subject should adjust
subsequent behavior. For example, uncertainty could modulate the learning rate used
for belief updating in changing environments modulate learning rate (Yu and Dayan,
2005; Nassar et al., 2012).
Reward expectation is the product of the probability of obtaining a reward and the
magnitude of the reward. According to the expected utility theory, in value-based
decision-making paradigm, optimal decision should favor the option with the higher
reward expectation (Rangel et al., 2008). This theory has been verified in animal
matching behavior tasks (Lau and Glimcher, 2008). Post-decision reward expectation
could be used for computing the “reward prediction error”, a key quantity in the
reinforcement learning framework (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Samejima et al., 2005; Daw
and Doya, 2006; Schultz, 2015). The reward prediction error, hence reward expectation,
is also useful for detecting environment change in order to adapt the behavior and
strategy accordingly (Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2010; Mathys et al., 2011;
Meder et al., 2017).
Confidence and reward expectation are closely linked, because, from the
decision maker’s point of view, the probability of getting the reward is essentially the
estimation of the probability of a decision being made is correct, in other words,
confidence. Therefore, reward expectation becomes a scaled version of confidence, with
reward magnitude being the scalar. When there is no internal bias, confidence of
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choosing each option should be the same. When the two options are associated with the
same magnitude of reward, confidence and reward expectation are perfectly correlated.
This perfect correlation between confidence and reward expectation poses challenge to
distinguish their individual behavior effects and neural correlates. Therefore, confidence
and reward expectation are usually not distinguished in the same study.
With our reward-biased visual motion discrimination task (the same task as in
Chapter 2 and 3), confidence is no longer perfectly correlated with reward expectation,
thus allowing us to differentiate their individual effects and neural representations. In this
chapter, I will first present how we compute confidence and reward expectation and key
features of these quantities under equal-reward, no-bias condition. Then I will show how
reward asymmetry and reward bias enable us to differentiate confidence from reward
expectation. Finally, I will examine the behavioral effects of confidence and reward
expectation in our monkeys and the neural representations of these quantities in the
caudate nucleus.

Results
Reward asymmetry-induced bias can help distinguish between confidence and
reward expectation.
Because we did not have direct measurements of the monkeys’ confidence
levels, we first computed confidence and reward expectation from the monkeys’
behavioral performance, based on the following assumptions: (1) the monkeys’ decision
processes were approximated by the drift-diffusion model as described in Chapter 2; (2)
the monkeys did not have direct access to the motion coherence in each trial, because
all coherence levels were randomly interleaved; and 3) their confidence depended on
112

the choice they made and the time it took to make that decision, marginalized over all
possible coherence levels. Reward expectation was computed as a product of
confidence and reward magnitude of the chosen option (for equal-reward condition, the
reward magnitudes were set to 1; for asymmetric-reward condition, the reward
magnitudes were normalized by the magnitude of the small reward).
We then verify that the confidence we computed follows the same pattern as the
confidence measured in previous studies. Under the no-bias condition, the confidence
we computed decreases as a function of decision time and increases as a function of
motion coherence (Figure 4.1 D and J). These patterns are consistent with previous
results based on confidence measured directly in human subjects performing an equalreward version of our decision task (Kiani et al., 2014: Figure 2) or inferred from
behavior performance (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Kiani et al., 2014;
Lak et al., 2019). As expected under equal-reward condition, the reward expectation
follows the same pattern as confidence (Figure 4.1 G and M), making the two quantities
indistinguishable.
In contrast, with reward asymmetry-induced biases, confidence and reward
expectation are no longer perfectly correlated (Figure 4.1 middle and right columns).
Confidence for small-reward choices is overall higher than that for large-reward choices
(Figure 4.1E, F, K and L: blue curves are above red curves), because a small-reward
choice requires more sensory evidence to support it, therefore is more likely to be
correct. This difference in confidence increases with bias (compare the distance
between red and blue curves for dark and light shades). Reward expectation, on the
other hand, can be lower for small-reward choices with high confidence than for largereward choices with low confidence, depending on the reward ratio (Figure 4.1 H, I, N
113

and O: the blue curves are under the red curves). Given the same reward ratio, the
difference in reward expectation may decrease with bias. These results suggest that,
the presence of reward-bias in the decision-making process and the difference in reward
magnitude of the two choices reduce the correlation between confidence and reward
expectation, making them partially distinguishable in the same experiment.
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Figure 4.1. Confidence and reward expectation depended on decision time, motion coherence,
and reward asymmetry-induced biases.
(A- C) Psychometric functions of DDM- simulated decision behaviors in three scenarios: no-bias, equal
reward (A), me-bias to contralateral (large reward) option (B), z-bias to contralateral (large reward)
option (C). Circles indicate the coherence levels that were interleaved in the simulated trials. Black/gray
color in B and C: larger/smaller reward biases. DDM parameters used are: a=2; k=8; tnd = 0; fixed bound;
me = 0.08 and 0.15 for smaller and larger me-bias, respectively; z = 0.76 and 0.86 for smaller and larger
z-bias, respectively. me and z were chosen to generate similar amount of choice-bias (horizontal shift of
the psychometric function at chance level).
(D-F) Confidence as a function of decision time, computed from the simulated behaviors in A-C,
respectively. Red/Blue: trials choosing the large/small reward options. Darker/lighter shades: behavior
with larger/smaller reward bias (corresponds to the black/gray psychometric functions in B and C).
(G-I) Reward expectation as a function of decision time. Same format as D-F. LR: large reward; SR:
small reward. Reward magnitude = 1.5 and 1 for large and small reward options, respectively.
(J-O) Confidence (in J-L) and reward expectation (in M-O) as a function of motion coherence, computed
from the simulated behaviors in A-C, respectively. Same format as D-F.

Because reward-bias in the DDM could be generated by two different
mechanisms: biasing the drift-rate (me-bias) and biasing the decision-rule (z-bias), and
because the monkeys used both kinds of biasing mechanisms (as shown in Chapter 2),
we examined how me-bias and z-bias influence confidence and reward expectation
respectively. For confidence, me-bias tends to magnify the difference between smalland large-reward options more at longer decision time and for lower coherences (Figure
4.1 E and K). In contrast, z-bias tends to increase the confidence difference between
small- and large-reward options more at shorter decision time and for higher coherences
(Figure 4.1 F and L). For reward expectation, the patterns are almost the opposite: mebias tends to magnify the difference between small- and large-reward options more at
shorter decision time and for higher coherences (Figure 4.1 H and N), whereas z-bias
tends to increase the confidence difference between small- and large-reward options
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more at longer decision time and for lower coherences (Figure 4.1 I and O). These
different patterns further suggested that confidence and reward expectation are two
distinguishable quantities in our experiment.

Confidence and reward expectation influenced monkeys’ subsequent decision
behavior in some sessions
Confidence and reward expectation can be used in conjunction with
feedback/reward outcome to evaluate how well the decision was made and whether
adjustments in subsequent decisions are necessary. Inspired by a recent study
demonstrating confidence-dependent post-error adjustments in well-trained monkeys
(Kiani’s post-error paper), we examined whether the monkeys on our task used
confidence or reward expectation to adjust their subsequent decisions. In other words,
we assessed the degree to which each evaluative quantity computed from the previous
trial affected the monkeys’ choice and reaction time for the current trial. Due to the small
numbers of error trials, we focused our analysis of these sequential effects on only
decisions following correct trials.
We used model fitting with logistic functions to measure two potential sequential
effects on the monkeys’ choice behavior: (1) increase or decrease the tendency to
choose the large-reward options (“reward bias”), reflected as opposite-direction shifts in
the psychometric functions of the two reward contexts (Figure 4.2 B, right panel), and (2)
increase or decrease the tendency to choose the contralateral option, regardless of its
reward size (“choice bias”), reflected as same-direction shifts in the psychometric
functions of the two reward contexts (Figure 4.2 C, right panel). We used model fitting
with linear functions to measure two potential sequential effects on the monkeys’ RT
116

behavior: (1) speed up or slow down the reaction time overall for both large- and smallreward choices (“baseline RT”), reflected as same-direction shifts (Figure 4.2 D, right
panel) and (2) increase or decrease the difference in RT between large- and smallreward choices (“reward bias in RT”), reflected as opposite-direction shifts of the RT
function for large- and small-reward choices (Figure 4.2 E, right panel). For each of the
two evaluative quantities, we compared the goodness-of-fits of four models in order to
identify the specific kinds of sequential effect: 1) “full model”: including effects on choice
bias, reward bias, baseline RT, and reward bias in RT; 2) “choice-only”: including only
effects on choice and reward biases; 3) “RT-only”: including only effects on baseline RT
and reward bias in RT; and 4) “No-seq”: no sequential effects. We then compared the
best-fitting models with confidence-dependent sequential effects and reward
expectation-dependent sequential effects to assess whether the sequential effects in the
monkeys’ behaviors were more likely to be confidence- or reward expectation-related.

Figure 4.2 Confidence- and reward expectation-related sequential influence on monkeys’ choice
and RT.
Sessions with no sequential effect (top row, black), confidence-related sequential effects (middle row,
“Conf-seq”) and reward expectation-related sequential effects (bottom row, “RewExp-seq”). Shades:
sessions with sequential effects on choice alone/ choice and RT/ RT alone.

Of the 117 sessions, we found confidence- and reward expectation-related
sequential effects in 28 and 39 sessions, respectively. For each session, the sequential
effect could be on choice alone, RT alone or both (different shades in the middle and
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bottom rows in Figure 4.2 A). This suggested that both confidence and reward
expectation influenced monkeys’ subsequent decisions in subsets and separate
sessions.
We then examined if any task or behavior parameter could predict whether the
monkey had confidence-related, reward expectation-related, or no sequential effects.
For example, we hypothesized that the monkeys tended to have no sequential effects
when their perceptual sensitivity is high. To examine this hypothesis, we examine
whether the cumulative distributions of sessions with no sequential effects (Figure 4.2figure supplement 1, red lines in the first column) over a range of perceptual sensitivity is
different from the cumulative distributions of sessions with confidence-related (orange)
and reward expectation-related (blue) sequential effects, and is more skewed towards
high motion sensitivity. We found that in monkey F, the monkey tended to have reward
expectation-related sequential effects when his motion sensitivity is high (blue curve
skewed towards right) and no sequential effect when his motion sensitivity is low (the
blue and red distribution functions are significantly different: two-sample KolmogorovSmirnov test, p<0.05). This monkey could have confidence-related sequential effect
regardless of whether his motion sensitivity is high or low (the orange distribution
function is not significantly different from either the red one or the blue one: two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p>0.05). For monkey C, we did not see any significant
correlation between the monkey’s motion sensitivity and whether the monkey had
sequential effect (Figure 4.2-figure supplement 1 bottom left panel. All three distributions
are the same, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), which is different from monkey F. Other task
parameters we examined, including whether being an early or late session, the ratio
between large and small reward, and the correlation between reward expectation and
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confidence, could not predict whether the monkeys had sequential effect or not.

Figure 4.2-figure supplement 1. Whether a session has no sequential effect (NoSeq), confidencerelated sequential effects (Conf-seq) or reward expectation-related sequential effects (RewExpseq), cannot be predicted by the sessions’ motion sensitivity, whether the session was earlier or
later in data collection, ratio between large and small reward sizes, or the correlation strength
between confidence and reward expectation.
X-axes: values of the possible predictors ordered from small to large. Y-axes: empirical cumulative
distribution functions of the sessions with no sequential effects, confidence-related and reward
expectation-related sequential effects.

Despite the difference between the two monkeys, we found that in well-trained
monkeys, confidence and reward expectation still had influence on their subsequent
decision behaviors. This suggests that neural correlates of confidence and reward
expectation should exist somewhere in the brain. Next we examine whether they exist in
the caudate nucleus.
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Confidence and reward expectation are both represented in caudate post-decision
activity.
In chapter 3, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 showed that caudate post-decision
activity was modulated by motion coherence, reward size and decision time. Figure 4.1
showed that confidence and reward expectation are also jointly influenced by these
three parameters. These results motivated us to consider the possibility of caudate
neurons representing these two specific evaluative quantities.
Indeed, we found neural correlates of confidence and reward expectation in
some caudate neurons. Figure 4.3 showed four examples: the neuron in (A) was more
active when choosing small reward option, it is also more active in high coherence and
short decision time trials. The neural activity patterns resemble confidence in that
session. The neuron in (B) behaved almost the opposite, preferring large-reward option,
low coherence and long decision time, which is similar to the negative of confidence.
The neuron in (C) was more active when choosing large reward option, and preferred
high coherence and short decision time, resembling the pattern of reward expectation.
The neuron in (D) preferred small-reward option, low coherence and long decision time,
which is similar to the negative of reward expectation in that session.
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Figure 4.3 Example post-decision caudate neural activities that resemble confidence and reward
expectation.
Activity of four example neurons that resembles positive reward expectation (A), negative reward
expectation (B), positive confidence (C) and negative confidence (D). Top row: mean firing rate from 0.2s
before saccade to 0.4s after saccade. Shades: coherence levels. Colors: reward size. SR: small-reward
choices; LR: large reward choices. Firing rates were computed using a 200 ms running window (50-ms
steps). Middle row: average firing rate (left) and confidence or reward expectation (right) as a function of
coherence. Dots are the coherence levels used in that session. Ribbon: standard error. Bottom row:
average firing rate (left) and confidence or reward expectation (right) as a function of decision time.
Decision time was obtained from DDM fits and grouped into five quantiles. The average firing rate (dots)
and standard error (ribbon) was computed from trial within each quantile. “Preferred” indicate the choice
with higher firing rate on average. The time window used for computing average firing rate for middle and
bottom rows are indicated by the green bars on the top row. Only correct trials were included.

To examine the prevalence of confidence and reward expectation representation
among the caudate population, we used correlation analysis on the neurons’ postdecision activity. Because confidence and reward expectation both varies with decision
time, we first identified the neurons whose post-decision activity to the preferred
direction showed decision time modulation (57 out of 142 neurons, Spearman correlation
between epoch-averaged firing rate and decision time, p<0.05). For these neurons, we
then examined if their firing rate was correlated with confidence or reward expectation.
Partial-correlations were used to account for the correlation between confidence and
reward expectation. We found subpopulations that represented the positive and negative
values of both confidence (red and blue bars in the top row in Figure 4.4 A) and reward
expectation (red and blue bars in the bottom row in Figure 4.4 A), corresponding to each
of the examples shown in Figure 4.4. Moreover, confidence and reward expectation
appear to be predominantly represented by distinct subpopulations of caudate neurons:
only 17 neurons’ activity showed correlation with both confidence and reward
expectation (pink circles in Figure 4.4 B), fewer than the number of neurons whose
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activity correlated with only confidence or reward expectation (36 neurons, dark and light
blue circles in Figure 4.4 B). Therefore, confidence and reward expectation are both
represented in individual caudate neurons.

Figure 4.4 Confidence and reward expectation correlate with the post-saccade activity in
subpopulation of caudate neurons.
(A) Top row: Spearman partial correlation between confidence and post-decision neural activity in the
preferred direction (FR), accounting for additional correlation with reward expectation (Corr(FR, Conf |
RewExp)). Bottom row: Spearman partial correlation between reward expectation and post-decision
neural activity in the preferred direction, accounting for additional correlation with confidence (Corr(FR,
RewExp | Conf)). Each column in the heatmap corresponds to the same unit. Color bar: Spearman
correlation coefficient (non-significant correlation coefficients (p>=0.05) are plotted as white.
(B) Scatterplot of Spearman partial correlation coefficients for the decision time-modulated neurons.
Colors indicate significant partial correlation between neural activity and confidence (light blue), reward
expectation (dark blue), both (red) and neither (yellow).
Filled circles correspond to example neurons in Figure 4.3.

Although we found sessions with confidence- and reward expectation-related
sequential effects, and neurons representing confidence and reward expectation, we
could not find strong link between the neural activity and sequential behavior (Table 4.1):
in sessions without sequential effect, we recorded both confidence-representing neurons
and reward expectation-representing neurons, suggesting that the caudate nucleus
encodes evaluative information even if it is not used behaviorally. In sessions with
confidence-related sequential effects, we found neurons representing reward
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expectation in their neural activity. Similarly, in sessions with reward expectation-related
sequential effects, we found neurons whose activity represented confidence. This
phenomenon is possible if confidence and reward expectation are represented
simultaneously. However, this possible explanation needs to be verified using
simultaneous recording in large caudate populations.
Table 4.1. Distribution of confidence- and reward expectation-representing neurons in sessions with
confidence-related sequential effects, reward expectation-related sequential effects and no
sequential effects.

# of Neurons
representing Conf
# of Neurons
representing RewExp
# of Neurons
representing both

Sessions with
Conf-related
sequential effect

Sessions with
RewExp-related
sequential effect

Sessions without
sequential effect

6

7

9

7

4

4

2

7

3

Discussion
Post-decision evaluation is important for learning and adaptive decision-making.
By comparing the expectation and outcome, one can learn the statistical structure of the
environment and the most rewarding actions and strategies. Even when a behavior is
well learned, constant evaluation could help detect changes in the environment or our
performance level, so that we could make necessary adjustments in time. Meanwhile,
confidence could provide context in which prediction error can be appropriately
interpreted. For example, a large prediction error with low confidence could be due to the
task being difficult, whereas a large prediction error with high confidence might suggest
changes in the environment (Purcell and Kiani, 2016)
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Using a perceptual decision task that induced reward-driven biased decision
behavior, we were able to partially dissociate confidence and reward expectation, two of
the key evaluative quantities. We found that both confidence and reward expectation
could influence subsequent decisions. Single-unit extracellular recordings showed that
these two evaluative quantities were represented in the post-decision activities of
subpopulation of the caudate nucleus.
Confidence and reward expectation are usually highly correlated and therefore
indistinguishable in the same task. We found that the co-presence of reward magnitude
asymmetry and reward-biased behavior could reduce their correlation, making them
distinguishable. The key to this decorrelation is that small-reward choices tend link to
high confidence, but could still lead to low reward expectation, if the reward magnitude is
too low. However, to what extend are confidence and reward expectation dissociable
depends on the magnitude of reward bias and the magnitude of reward asymmetry. If
the difference between large- and small-reward choices is too big, or if the reward
asymmetry is too small, confidence and reward expectation will still be highly correlated.
One extreme scenario is when the behavior was biased by prior. For example, if the
leftward motion appears more often, but the reward magnitudes of the two choices are
the same, the subject might develop a prior-driven bias towards the left. In this case, his
leftward choice would correspond to lower confidence, and the rightward choice would
correspond to higher confidence. However, because the two choices have the same
reward size, the leftward choice would also correspond to lower reward expectation, and
the rightward choice would correspond to higher reward expectation. Therefore, to what
extend are confidence and reward expectation correlated in the same task requires
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careful examination. Still, our task provides a paradigm in which the two quantities can
be distinguished.
Our results regarding the sequential effects and neural representation of
confidence and reward expectation hinge on the assumption that the confidence we
computed approximates the monkeys’ actual confidence. Although the confidence we
computed showed patterns consistent with previously measured confidence (Kiani et al.,
2014), the study could be improved by having a direct behavioral measurement of
confidence or reward expectation, against which our computation could be verified. For
tasks using animal subjects, it might be challenging to instruct monkeys to report their
confidence on a scale (like in the human study by Kiani et al, 2014). Post-decision wager
and anticipatory licking could still be used to reflect the animal’s reward expectation
(Watanabe et al., 2001; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Fetsch et al., 2014). The setup with
direct measurement would also allow us to examine whether the caudate nucleus has
causal link with confidence or reward expectation computation.
Although many studies have shown sequential effect and performance
improvement based on reward prediction error, those are usually in environment with
hidden structures that needs to be learned by accumulating evidence across trials, or in
changing environments in which the animal has to figure out when the change happens,
or when the reward structure needs to be learned (Botvinick et al., 2011; Seo et al.,
2012; Lak et al., 2019). Our task was designed in a way that all the information about the
task is available in the current trial: the sensory information in each trial is independent
from the next, and reward context changes were cued to the animals. As a result, in
many sessions our monkey did not show any sequential effects. However, there could
be many reasons for the presence of sequential effects in some sessions. First,
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sequential effects might be hardwired into our behaviors, therefore hard to suppress,
even if it is not the optimal strategy, such as confirmation bias (Talluri et al., 2018).
Second, the monkeys could use past confidence and reward expectation to assess their
performance and adjust their decision strategies when necessary. This is particularly
possible given that the monkeys needed to calibrate sensory-encoding bias and
decision-rule bias according to the reward function gradient, and they needed to know
when is good enough. Finally, the monkeys’ arousal level might be different from session
to session. It has been shown that arousal level is linked with the balance between
exploration and exploitation (Stephens and Krebs, 1986; Behrens et al., 2007), as well
as the level of task engagement (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). It is possible that when
the animals were more alert, they were more likely to use confidence and reward
expectation for exploring better strategies.
Post-decision activity in the caudate nucleus have been found to represent
various kinds of monitoring- and evaluation-related information, including the value of the
chosen option in non-perceptual decisions (Cromwell and Schultz, 2003; Lau and
Glimcher, 2008), the difficulty level of perceptual decisions (Ding and Gold, 2010) and
categorical decision boundary (Yanike and Ferrera, 2014). Our results added to the
existing knowledge by showing that caudate nucleus can also carry confidence and
reward expectation information in different caudate neurons. Future work with large
population recording would be able to assess whether the neurons representing these
two quantities coexist in two subpopulations simultaneously, or caudate neurons would
represent one kind of evaluative signal at a time. If the former scenario is true, given that
reward expectation is computed from confidence, it would be interesting to know if the
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transformation from confidence to reward expectation is conducted by the local circuit
within the caudate nucleus, or elsewhere.
Outside the caudate nucleus, the midbrain dopaminergic neurons are known to
encode reward expectation before feedback and reward prediction error after feedback
(Schultz, 1997; Nomoto et al., 2010; Lak et al., 2019). One study optogenetically
manipulated dopamine neurons in rats during decision and during reward delivery. They
found that manipulating dopaminergic neurons during decision does not influence
ongoing decision or subsequent learning, whereas manipulating the neurons during
feedback led to behavioral changes that could be modeled by changing the reward
prediction error (Lak et al., 2019). It suggests that the reward expectation error signal
might play a causal role in learning, whereas the reward expectation does not. It is
possible that the reward expectation signal in the dopaminergic neurons were inherited
from other brain areas, such as the caudate nucleus. In rats, a part of the striatum called
striosome sends direct projections to dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra
compacta (SNc) (Fujiyama et al., 2011; Watabe-Uchida et al., 2012). The striosome-SNc
projections could carry the reward expectation signal from the striatum to SNc, which
could be used for computing reward prediction error upon reward delivery.

Materials and Methods
Subjects
Same as in Chapter 3. Only monkey F and monkey C were used.

Behavioral task
Same as Chapter 3.
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Data acquisition
Same as Chapter 3.

DDM model fitting
Same as Chapter 2.

Computation of confidence and reward expectation
Computing Confidence
Because the motion direction and coherence in each trial was pseudo-randomly
selected and unknown to the monkeys, all the information known to the monkeys at the
end of a decision were their choice and decision time. Therefore, we define confidence
as the estimation of their accuracy on average given the current choice and decision
time, as following:

Eq. (1)
, in which T is the decision time (reaction time minus non-decision time).
P(correct | Right/Left choice at T) is computed by marginalizing over all possible
coherences (this can be achieved by having performed the task over and over). For
example, for rightward choices:
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Eq. (2)
, where cohi is signed coherence (+/ for rightward and leftward motion). We defined a
choice being correct as the choice being in the same direction as the motion coherence.
For example, for rightward choices:

.

Eq. (3)

In our task design, each coherence had equal chance of appearance, except that
coh=0 happened twice as often as the other coherences:

.

Eq. (4)

After plugging equation (3) and (4) into equation (2), what’s left is P(Right choice
at T|cohi). We assume that the DDM approximates the monkeys’ decision-making
process. This quantity was obtained by DDM simulation using the best-fitting
parameters, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. For each coherence, we obtained the probability
of the decision variable (DV) attaining a value x at time t (P(DV(t) = x), using the best
fitting DDM parameters of each session and reward context. Then we computed the
area underneath the probability function when DV > Right bound for rightward choices,
or DV < Left bound for leftward choices.
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Figure 4.5 Related to “computing confidence” in Methods: Computing the probability of making
a rightward choice at time T for a given motion coherence.
Schematic illustrating how to compute the probability of making a rightward choice at time T for a given
motion coherence (P(Right choice at T | coh)) using the DDM framework. For each coherence, obtain
the probability of decision variable (DV) attaining value x at time t (red curve), then compute the area
underneath the probability function when DV > Right bound (shaded area). For leftward choices,
compute the area underneath the probability function when V < Left bound.

Computing Reward Expectation
Reward expectation is the product of the probability of getting a reward (i.e.
confidence) and the reward size associated with the choice:
Eq. (5)
, where reward size was set to 1 for small-reward choices and was set to the ratio
between large and small reward for large-reward choices:

Eq. (6)
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Confidence as a function of coherence
Eq. (1) shows that confidence is a function of decision time (also see Figure 4.1),
which is consistent with previous study in which human subject directly reported
confidence in a reaction-time task (Kiani et. al., 2014). The relationship between average
confidence and coherence emerges indirectly through the relationship between
coherence and decision time:

Eq. (7)
, where T is decision time; Conf(T) is confidence at decision time T; P(T | cohi) is the
probability of making a decision at time T for a given coherence i. Simulation of the
relationships between mean confidence, mean reward expectation and coherence are
illustrated in Figure 4.1 J-O.

Neural data analysis
For each neuron, we computed the average firing rates (FR) in a peri-saccade
300 ms window beginning at 100 ms before saccade onset and a post-saccade 400 ms
window beginning at saccade onset (before reward delivery). We compared the mean
firing rates across trials for the two epochs and applied further analyses on the epoch
associated with the higher mean firing rate. For the chosen epoch, we compared the
mean firing rate across trials for the two choice directions. The choice direction
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associated with higher mean firing rate was identified as the “preferred” direction, and
the opposite direction was identified as the “null” direction (see examples in Figure 4.3).

Decision time modulation of the post-decision neural activity
For each neuron, we compute the Spearman correlation between the average
firing rate in the trials of the preferred direction in the chosen epoch (FRpref) and the
decision time of those trials. Neurons with significant Spearman correlation coefficients
(p<0.05) were identified as decision time-modulated neurons.

Correlation between post-decision neural activity and confidence and reward expectation
For each decision time-modulated neuron, we computed the Spearman partial
correlation between the average firing rate in the trials of the preferred direction in the
chosen epoch (FRpref) and the confidence and reward expectation of those trials
(corr(FR, Conf | RewExp) and corr(FR, RewExp | Conf) in Figure 4.4), to account for the
correlation between confidence and reward expectation.

Confidence-related and reward expectation-related sequential effects on the
monkeys’ choice and reaction time
To examine whether confidence or reward expectation influences the monkeys’
behavior in the next trial, we fit logistic function (Eq. 8) and linear function (Eq. 9) to the
monkeys’ choice and reaction time. Only trials after a correct trial were included.
For the choice data in each session, we fitted the following function to the choice
data:
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(Eq. 8)
, where Pcontra is the probability of choose contralateral choice; Coh is signed coherence
of current trials (+/ for motion towards contralateral/ipsilateral direction);

;

;
Prev is the value of the evaluative quantity (confidence or reward expectation) in the
previous trials, centered to its mean across trials.

Sequential reward-bias =

. A positive

sequential reward-bias means that when the evaluative quantity was high, the monkey
biased more to the larger-reward option in the next trial.

Sequential choice-bias =

. A positive

sequential choice-bias means that when the evaluative quantity was high, the monkey
biased more to the contralateral option in the next trial.
For the RT data in each session, we fitted the following function to the trials when
both the previous and the current trial were correct:

(Eq. 9)
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, in which Coh is the un-signed motion coherence in the current trials (positive for both
directions)

;

;
Prev is defined the same way as in the logistic function.
bPrev is the reward size-independent sequential effect on RT. This term being
positive/negative means that when the evaluative quantity was high, the monkey tended
to speed up/slowdown in the next trial.
bPrevRew is the reward size-dependent sequential effect on RT. This term being
positive/negative suggests that when the evaluative quantity was high, the monkeys
tended to speed up/slowdown when choosing the large-reward option and
slowdown/speed up when choosing the small-reward option in the next trial.
Log likelihood of a model is the sum of the log likelihoods of the logistic and
linear fits. For the confidence version (Conf-seq) and the reward expectation version
(RewExp-seq), we fitted the following three models:
(1) “Full model”: sequential effect included in both the logistic function and the
linear function (i.e. 𝞫PrevContraLR, 𝞫PrevContraLR, bPrev and bPrevRew are all included);
(2) “Choice-only”: sequential effect included in the logistic function but no
sequential effect in the linear function (i.e. bPrev and bPrevRew are not included);
(3) “RT-only”: no sequential effect in the logistic function but sequential effect
included in the linear function (i.e. 𝞫PrevContraLR and 𝞫PrevContraLR are not included).
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We also fitted a no-sequential effect model (NoSeq)—none of 𝞫PrevContraLR,
𝞫PrevContraLR, bPrev or bPrevRew is included.
AIC was used for model comparison. For Conf-seq and RewExp-seq, among the
three models, we selected the one that has the smallest AIC as the best-fitting model.
Then we compared the AICs between the best-fitting models in the Conf-seq version
and the RewExp-seq version, together with the NoSeq model. The model with the
smallest AIC was used to interpret whether the sequential effects in a session were
confidence-related or reward expectation related, or did not exist.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Yunshu Fan, Joshua I Gold, Long Ding

Using a task that encouraged monkeys to combine sensory and reward
information for decision-making, I found that the way the monkeys combined sensory
and reward information generally conformed to a drift-diffusion model (DDM). However,
the specific biasing strategies they used were suboptimal, and varied from session to
session and monkey to monkey. By linking the monkeys’ strategies with their individual
reward functions, we found that the suboptimal and variable strategies were consistent
with a common rational heuristic. This heuristic is sensitive to the individual variabilities
of the reward functions across monkeys and sessions, which led to the individual
variations in the monkeys’ idiosyncratic biasing strategies.
By recording in the caudate nucleus while the monkeys were performing the
reward-biased perceptual decision task, we found that the caudate nucleus represented
information related to the decision process throughout the trial. Specifically, before the
decision starts, some caudate neurons represented reward context, which could be used
to establish the reward bias towards a specific option later in the trial, similar to a starting
value bias in the DDM. During decision formation, both sensory and reward information
were combined in a subpopulation of individual caudate neurons. This result, together
with a subsequent study that established the causal role of caudate nucleus in
combining sensory and reward information using electrical micro-stimulation, suggests
that caudate neurons may participate in combining sensory and reward information for
decision formation. After decision, we found that sensory evidence and reward
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information continued to be represented in individual caudate neurons, but not all of
them conform to an intuitive “reward expectation” signal. We further found that our task
design allowed us to disambiguate reward expectation from confidence; these two
quantities were usually indistinguishable in conventional task designs (Kepecs et al.,
2008; Lak et al., 2019). This allowed us to find out that while some caudate neurons’
post-decision activity represented reward expectation, some other caudate neurons’
activities represented confidence. We also found that confidence and reward expectation
each influenced monkeys’ decision behaviors in the future in a subset of sessions,
suggesting that the confidence-like and reward expectation-like signals encoded in the
caudate post-decision activity could be used for evaluation.
These findings open up a number of future directions as follow.

Experimental/Task design
Importance of carefully designed complex behavior tasks
Our results highlight how, in the context of studying complex behavior, the task
design can reveal aspects of behavior that are otherwise hidden. In the context of goaldirected behavior, the brain can combine multiple sources of information adaptively in
response to changes in the environment, as well as to changes in internal states.
Internal states might refer not only to the preference for a specific reward, but also to the
proficiency to make accurate perceptual judgements. In many asymmetric-reward
experimental paradigms, the ability to adapt to reward preference leads us to observe
reward-driven bias in the behavior. Our task added an additional manipulation, i.e.,
either large or small reward was given only when the perception was correct. This
tapped into the brain’s ability to adapt the reward-driven bias to the proficiency of making
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accurate perceptual judgements. This design also allowed us to observe that the
monkeys calibrated their biasing strategy with regard to their motion sensitivity: when
motion sensitivity was high, i.e., when the monkeys were able to make more accurate
perceptual decisions, they tended to have less reward bias and their strategies were
closer to the optimal. In contrast, when motion sensitivity was low, i.e., when the
monkeys were making less accurate perceptual decisions, they tended to have more
reward bias, and their strategies were farther from the optimal. This can be understood
from the reward function’s perspective. When motion sensitivity is high, the peak of the
reward function is closer to no bias, and the plateau of the reward function is also
smaller. This will encourage sub-optimal but good enough strategies to be closer to the
peak, which is also closer to no bias. On the contrary, when motion sensitivity is low, the
peak of the reward function corresponds to large bias. Meanwhile, the plateau of the
reward function is big. This will allow more deviation from the optimal strategy to be good
enough, which magnifies the magnitude of bias. This bias-sensitivity tradeoff not only
explained the individual variability among our monkeys’ decision behaviors, but could
also be one of the reasons why many previous studies using similar tasks found that
subjects appeared to adopt different decision strategies (Voss et al., 2004; Bogacz et al.,
2006; Simen et al., 2009; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010; Leite and Ratcliff, 2011;
Mulder et al., 2012; Goldfarb et al., 2014; Cicmil et al., 2015). We were able to uncover
this relationship between bias and proficiency due to the specific complexity in our task
design.
The decisions we make every day are usually complex and are influenced by
many factors. While simpler tasks are useful in probing the underlying neural
mechanisms, complex tasks can help discover the effect of some factors that are only
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revealed during complex behaviors. Our results highlight the importance of using a
carefully designed complex behavioral task with systematic quantitative modeling and
analyses to understand various factors that influence adaptive behaviors and strategies.

Task design should allow key variables to be dissociable.
When some variables are involved in generating the behavior but are not directly
accessible via measurements, computational modeling is often used to extract these
latent variables for further hypothesis testing and interpreting neural computations. We
need to make sure that the task design will allow different latent variables in the model to
be distinguishable from one another. For example, we were able to examine whether the
reward biased the monkeys’ sensory-encoding (me-bias) or decision rule-setting (z-bias)
via DDM fitting, because our task provided reaction time data. The reaction time data is
crucial because, in DDM, me and z could generate similar choice biases, but the RT
distributions they generated are qualitatively different, especially when compared
between error and correct trials (Figure 2.3-figure supplement 1). Similarly, we were able
to examine the neural correlates of confidence and reward expectation in the same task
because our task and the reward-biased behavior it induced allow the two variables to
exhibit different patterns (Figure 4.1). In contrast, many previous studies that use equalreward task design were not able to identify if the behavioral effects and neural
correlates they were studying were related to confidence or reward expectation (Kepecs
et al., 2008; Lak et al., 2019). If distinguishing two variables is the key to the scientific
question under study, the behavior task needs to be designed (or redesigned) so that
the two variables generate qualitatively different behavioral readouts.
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Task design is an iterative process.
As a research project develops, preliminary results can inform how a task should
be modified. My thesis project has shown me that it is hard to predict where the data
might lead us. Sometimes we might obtain results that were not expected, leading us to
new analyses to better understand the data. I will highlight this through three examples.
First, when studying the biasing behavior of the monkeys, we did not start with
investigating the specific heuristic. This came up because it appeared to better account
for our monkeys’ behavior patterns. Because our task was not ideally suited to observing
the “gradient ascent” searching process, we could not know when and how fast this
process happens. Answers to these questions require modification to our experiments,
such as: (1) collecting data during learning, and (2) removing the cue of the reward
context, and making the reward context switching unpredictable so as to increase the
chance of observing the “gradient ascent” learning and the adjusting process in the
behavior. A second example relates to a prediction of the rational, satisficing heuristic. It
predicts that, if the motion sensitivity is too low, the reward function gradient might be
steeper along the z dimension than along the me dimension. This would lead to a
rational suboptimal decision strategy that overly biases z to the adaptive direction and
compensate with me biased to the small reward direction. This hypothesis cannot be
tested with our data, because all of the monkeys used in our study have gone through
years of training on the motion discrimination task. In theory, they belong to the expert
group whose reward functions all favor the overly biasing me strategy. Whether a
subject with low motion sensitivity tends to favor an overly biasing z strategy would be
better tested in subjects with less training. Finally, Chapter 4 focused on two specific
evaluative signals–confidence and reward expectation, an angle that we did not plan
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when we designed the task. Therefore our task did not include a behavioral report of the
monkeys’ confidence levels. Although our task allowed confidence and reward
expectation to be distinguishable based on the way we computed them, our results
regarding the neural representation of confidence and reward expectation could have
been much stronger if we had a direct confidence measurement. Adding the behavioral
report would also allow us to examine if changes in the neural correlates results in
changes in confidence, or if manipulating the neural activities that represent confidence
and reward expectation would lead to corresponding changes in the behavior reports (in
the spirit of SENSE AND THE SINGLE NEURON: Probing the Physiology of Perception
(Parker and Newsome, 1998)). These examples illustrate how the task and experiments
should be adjusted dynamically in the light of new, especially unplanned, results.

Caudate nucleus and reward-biased perceptual decision-making
Distinct role of the caudate nucleus in combining sensory and reward information.
We discovered that during decision-formation period, both sensory and reward
information are represented in individual caudate neurons, but not in the format of a
decision variable (DV) in the DDM, especially in terms of bound crossing. A subsequent
study using micro-stimulation in the caudate nucleus during decision making in the same
task confirmed that the caudate nucleus is causally involved in combining sensory and
reward information (Doi et al., 2019). Meanwhile, cortical neurons in LIP have been
found to correlate with a DV that combines sensory evidence and non-sensory reward
bias and prior bias (Rorie et al., 2010; Hanks et al., 2011). These results suggest that
caudate nucleus is an intermediate station where sensory and reward information are
combined, playing a modulatory role, which could feed to the final DV elsewhere in the
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brain. It is still unclear what exact computations are performed by the caudate nucleus
and whether and how to they contribute to the DV formation. Previously, computational
models based on the specific anatomical structure of the basal ganglia have been
developed for action selection, decision-making and reinforcement learning (Redgrave et
al., 1999; Bogacz and Gurney, 2007; Samejima and Doya, 2007; Hikosaka et al., 2014;
Caballero et al., 2018). Adding reward-biasing mechanisms to these models could serve
as a starting point for understanding the computations performed in the caudate nucleus
and generally in the basal ganglia. Many of these models involve distinct computations
in the direct, indirect and hyperdirect pathways and the neural plasticity modulated by
different dopamine receptors. Given that we also observed diverse patterns of caudate
neural activity in single-unit recording, it is very likely that different caudate neurons
might be involved in different pathways or computational units. Future experiments using
large scale recording, the ability to identify the pathway they are in, and the neuronal
type (at least in terms of D1 or D2 receptor expression), will allow for a better
understanding of the specific computations performed by the caudate nucleus within the
basal ganglia circuitry.

Caudate nucleus in the context of basal ganglia circuitry
Meanwhile, the caudate nucleus is only the input station of the interconnected
basal ganglia circuitry. Information has to go through multiple stages of processing via
not only different pathways, but also recurrent loops, before sending out to other brain
areas. Even though we did not observe bound crossing-like activity patterns in the
caudate nucleus, a decision variable can be formed in downstream areas. Alternatively,
downstream areas might further modify the information they receive from the caudate
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nucleus, making the relationship between specific activity in caudate neurons and how
sensory and reward information are combined behaviorally more complicated. Isolating
the computational role of caudate nucleus might be similar to looking at one part of a
very complicated mathematical solution. Recording in caudate and downstream areas
simultaneously will allow us to understand how sensory and reward information are
combined in the basal ganglia as a whole and interpret the computational role of each
individual nucleus within the larger circuit.

Diverse computations in the caudate nucleus and information flow
We found that the caudate nucleus represented diverse computational quantities
before, during and after making a decision. It would be interesting to know whether these
diverse quantities are sent out separately to distinct targets, or whether they are all sent
to a range of target regions. For example, decision formation-related information might
be projected to motor-related areas, such as LIP, FEF and SC (Horwitz and Newsome,
1999; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Ding and Gold, 2012), for execution, whereas
evaluation-related information might be projected to areas involved in evaluation, error
signal encoding and metacognition, such as midbrain dopaminergic neurons, anterior
and posterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex (Schultz, 1997; Behrens et
al., 2007; Matsumoto et al., 2007; Heilbronner and Platt, 2013). Hypotheses like this
need to be verified by recording in multiple brain areas simultaneously during the same
task.
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New theoretical frameworks
A key foundation of our study is the theoretical framework, i.e., DDM. Even
thought it might not be implemented in the brain on a physical level, as defined by David
Marr (Marr and Poggio, 1977), computational models as such still provide us a useful
angle to examine behavior, neural activity and the links between them. In chapter 2, the
DDM helped us discover the specific deviation pattern of the monkey and the optimal
strategy and the link between bias and sensitivity. In chapter 3, it prompted us to
understand the information representation from the perspective of biases (in terms of
time-independent z-like, or time-increasing me-like) and decision formation (in terms of
decision variable). In chapter 4, it provided the method for computing confidence.
However, our results also pointed out the need for new theoretical frameworks to be
developed in many aspects as discussed below.

Frameworks and tools to understand individual variability
Individual variability commonly exists, although it might not be commonly
reported. Yet, it might sometimes reflect common factors that influence behavior. In
chapter 2, through examining the biasing strategy in the context of reward function, we
discovered one plausible mechanism for the individual variability we observed in our
monkeys – idiosyncratic perceptual sensitivity leads to different adjustments of biases in
response. However, we still don’t know how general this principle is in other kinds of
behavioral paradigms. It is very likely that this is only one mechanism underlying
individual variability. At least one other source of individual difference could come from
the differences in the mental complexity among subjects, both in terms of model
complexity (Tavoni et al., 2019) and how much past experience is used to inform future
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actions (Glaze et al., 2018). Currently there is no unified framework/guideline to
systematically examine individual variability.

The interaction between evaluation and adaptive decision-making
Even though we showed that the confidence and reward expectation influenced
subsequent decision behaviors (Chapter 4), our result was mainly descriptive. Through
what exact computation do they exert their evaluative role is still unclear. Many previous
studies on the neural correlates of evaluative signal also largely stayed on the level of
post-decision neurons representing task-relevant information, without going into how the
signals were used for the specific behavior. Evaluative signal in terms of reward
prediction error has been studied in the context of reinforcement learning (Sutton and
Barto, 1998; Doya, 2007). It has also been applied to link evaluative neural signals with
behavior in learning paradigms (Lak et al., 2019). In such a setting, the goal of
evaluation is to update the values in order to figure out the option with the best value.
However, outside learning, the goal of adaptive decision behaviors might not be rewardmaximization, yet evaluation might still be needed for minor strategy adjustments. In this
case, we need new theoretical frameworks for specifying what evaluation is needed and
how it could be used for behavioral adjustments.

Towards computational psychiatry
Computational modeling can link behavior with underlying neural mechanisms. The
recently emerged field of computational psychiatry is trying to apply the insights and
methodology from computational modeling to investigate the links between circuit
impairments and psychiatric symptoms. This might enhance our understanding of the
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psychiatric disorders not only on the level of molecular and physiological features (such
as neurexins mutation in Autism patients (Ching et al., 2010), and hyper-excitability in
epilepsy patients (Scharfman, 2007)), but also on the level of circuit functions (Wang and
Krystal, 2014). This could also lead to behavioral diagnosis for circuit dysfunction, more
effective targeting of the impaired circuit during treatment, and the use of behavioral
biomarkers for symptom monitoring during and after treatment. Psychiatric disorders
usually involve complex behaviors. My study described in the thesis assessed such
complex behaviors. Specifically, our results could open up a new dimension for
assessing behavior, i.e. the ability to adapt our strategy to our internal proficiency and
accuracy in performing a task. Even though we did not find the location(s) in the brain
that link strategy with proficiency, it is possible that damage to such brain structures
could impair the subjects’ ability to adjust strategies effectively when his/her proficiency
changes.
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